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Vrijheid van meningsuiting – Strafrechtelijke veroordeling van een advocaat wegens 
medeplichtigheid aan eerroof van onderzoeksrechters omwille van uitlatingen in de pers 
– Schending artikel 10 EVRM 
 
De zaak heeft betrekking op de strafrechtelijke veroordeling van een advocaat omwille van 
uitlatingen in de pers. Meer bepaald was de advocaat medeplichtig aan de eerroof van de 
onderzoeksrechters die ontlast werden van het opsporingsonderzoek betreffende het 
overlijden van de rechter Bernard Borrel.  
Volgens de Grote Kamer van het EHRM heeft de advocaat evenwel waardeoordelen geuit die 
steunden op een voldoende feitelijke basis. Zijn uitlatingen hebben de grenzen van het recht 
dat wordt gewaarborgd door artikel 10 EVRM niet overschreden en betroffen een onderwerp 
van algemeen belang, namelijk de werking van het gerecht en het verloop van de zaak Borrel.  
De Grote Kamer benadrukt weliswaar dat advocaten niet kunnen worden gelijkgesteld met 
journalisten vermits zij geen externe getuigen zijn die tot taak hebben het publiek te 
informeren, maar rechtstreeks betrokken zijn bij de werking van het gerecht en bij het 
verweer van een partij. Advocaten hebben wel het recht om gegronde twijfels te uiten over de 
integriteit en onpartijdigheid van magistraten in een concrete zaak en om die kritiek ook via 
de media openbaar te maken. De Grote Kamer stelt vast dat art. 10 EVRM werd geschonden 
omdat de strafrechtelijke veroordeling van de advocaat als niet noodzakelijk werd beoordeeld 
in een democratische samenleving. 
Er moet een groot belang worden gehecht aan de context van deze zaak, waarbij dient te 
worden benadrukt dat het gezag van de rechterlijke macht moet worden bewaard en er dient 
te worden toegezien op het wederzijdse respect tussen magistraten en advocaten. 
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 Zie ook D. VOORHOOF en I. HØEDT-RASMUSSEN, “Advocaat mag via media kritiek uiten op rechters”, 
De Juristenkrant 2015/310, 1 en 4. Het EHRM stelt in Morice t. Frankrijk ook een schending vast van artikel 6 
EVRM (onvoldoende waarborg (objectieve) onpartijdigheid van de rechtbank): op dit aspect van de zaak wordt 
in deze annotatie niet ingegaan. 
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THE LAW 
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION 
65. The applicant claimed that, before the Court of Cassation, his case had not been examined 
fairly by an impartial tribunal, having regard to the presence on the bench of a judge who had 
previously and publicly expressed his support for one of the civil parties, Judge M. He relied 
on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, of which the relevant part reads as follows: 
“In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by an 
independent and impartial tribunal established by law.” 
A. The Chamber judgment 
66. After noting that the applicant had not been in a position to request the judge’s 
withdrawal, as he had not been informed before the hearing of the change in the composition 
of the bench that was to examine his appeal on points of law and that the procedure was 
mainly written, the Chamber examined the complaint in terms of objective impartiality. It 
noted that Judge J.M., one of the judges who had sat on the bench of the Criminal Division of 
the Court of Cassation ruling on an appeal from Judge M. and from the applicant stemming 
from a dispute between them, had, nine years earlier, publicly expressed his support for and 
trust in Judge M. in connection with another case in which she had been the investigating 
judge and the applicant had been acting for a civil party. Having regard to the facts, there was 
clear opposition between the applicant and Judge M., both in the case for which she had 
received the support of Judge J.M. and in the case in which J.M. was sitting as a judge of the 
Court of Cassation. Moreover, J.M.’s support had been expressed in an official and quite 
general context, at the general meeting of the judges of the Paris tribunal de grande instance. 
The Chamber found that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1, as serious doubts could be 
raised as to the impartiality of the Court of Cassation and the applicant’s fears in that 
connection could be regarded as objectively justified. 
B. The parties’ arguments before the Grand Chamber 
1. The applicant 
67. The applicant recognised that it was not established that Judge J.M. had displayed any 
personal bias against him, but argued that regardless of his personal conduct, his very 
presence on the bench created a situation which rendered his fears objectively justified and 
legitimate. In his submission, the fact that J.M. had sat on the bench of the Criminal Division 
of the Court of Cassation sufficed in itself to show that there had been a violation of Article 6 
§ 1 of the Convention. Judge J.M. had in the past expressed his support for Judge M., when 
the latter was conducting the judicial investigation in the Church of Scientology case, in 
response to criticisms of her professional conduct from the civil parties, whose representatives 
included the applicant, and by the public prosecutor. The applicant pointed out that Judge M. 
had ultimately been taken off the case at his request and that on 5 January 2000 the French 
State had been found liable for failings in the public justice system. 
 
68. He argued that he had not been in a position to seek the withdrawal of Judge J.M., as he 
had not known, and could not reasonably have known, that this judge was going to sit in his 
case: the report of the reporting judge, the case “workflow” and the notices to the lawyers had 
all given the same information, namely that the Criminal Division was to sit as a reduced 
bench. The reduced bench comprised the President of the Division, the senior judge (Doyen) 
and the reporting judge, and as Judge J.M. occupied none of those positions he could not have 
been expected to sit. 
 
69. On the merits, the applicant did not claim that Judge J.M. had displayed any personal bias 
against him and was not calling into question that judge’s right to freedom of expression. He 
complained merely of Judge J.M.’s presence on the bench, which in his view rendered his 
fears of a lack of impartiality objectively justified and legitimate. In view of the support 
expressed by J.M. in favour of Judge M. in the context of another high-profile case with the 
same protagonists, there was serious doubt as to the impartiality of the Criminal Division and 
his fears in that connection could be regarded as objectively justified. 
2. The Government 
70. The Government observed that there was no question of any lack of subjective 
impartiality on the part of Judge J.M. and that it was therefore necessary to determine whether 
the circumstances of the case were such as to raise serious doubts about the Court of 
Cassation’s objective impartiality. Referring to the effect of the statement made in July 2000 
by Judge J.M., who at the time had been serving on the Paris tribunal de grande instance, 
they pointed out that the statement, made many years before the hearing of the Criminal 
Division, concerned a different case from the present one and that the terms used reflected a 
personal position which related only to the conditions in which disciplinary proceedings 
against a fellow judge had become known. The Government concluded that those remarks, 
which were limited in scope and had been made a long time before, were not sufficient to 
establish that, in his capacity as judge of the Court of Cassation, J.M. lacked objective 
impartiality. 
 
71. The Government further stated that appeals on points of law were extraordinary remedies 
and that the Court of Cassation’s oversight was restricted to compliance with the law. 
Moreover, it was an enlarged bench of the Criminal Division, comprising ten judges, that had 
considered the case. 
 
72. The respondent Government accordingly argued that Article 6 § 1 of the Convention had 
not been breached. 
C. The Court’s assessment 
1. General principles 
73. The Court reiterates that impartiality normally denotes the absence of prejudice or bias 
and its existence or otherwise can be tested in various ways. According to the Court’s settled 
case-law, the existence of impartiality for the purposes of Article 6 § 1 must be determined 
according to a subjective test where regard must be had to the personal conviction and 
behaviour of a particular judge, that is, whether the judge held any personal prejudice or bias 
in a given case; and also according to an objective test, that is to say by ascertaining whether 
the tribunal itself and, among other aspects, its composition, offered sufficient guarantees to 
exclude any legitimate doubt in respect of its impartiality (see, for example, Kyprianou v. 
Cyprus [GC], no. 73797/01, § 118, ECHR 2005-XIII, and Micallef v. Malta [GC], no. 
17056/06, § 93, ECHR 2009). 
 
74. As to the subjective test, the principle that a tribunal must be presumed to be free of 
personal prejudice or partiality is long-established in the case-law of the Court (see 
Kyprianou, cited above, § 119, and Micallef, cited above, § 94). The personal impartiality of a 
judge must be presumed until there is proof to the contrary (see Hauschildt v. Denmark, 24 
May 1989, § 47, Series A no. 154). As regards the type of proof required, the Court has, for 
example, sought to ascertain whether a judge has displayed hostility or ill will for personal 
reasons (see De Cubber v. Belgium, 26 October 1984, § 25, Series A no. 86). 
 
75. In the vast majority of cases raising impartiality issues the Court has focused on the 
objective test (see Micallef, cited above, § 95). However, there is no watertight division 
between subjective and objective impartiality since the conduct of a judge may not only 
prompt objectively held misgivings as to impartiality from the point of view of the external 
observer (objective test) but may also go to the issue of his or her personal conviction 
(subjective test) (see Kyprianou, cited above, § 119). Thus, in some cases where it may be 
difficult to procure evidence with which to rebut the presumption of the judge’s subjective 
impartiality, the requirement of objective impartiality provides a further important guarantee 
(see Pullar v. the United Kingdom, 10 June 1996, § 32, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 
1996-III). 
 
76. As to the objective test, it must be determined whether, quite apart from the judge’s 
conduct, there are ascertainable facts which may raise doubts as to his or her impartiality. This 
implies that, in deciding whether in a given case there is a legitimate reason to fear that a 
particular judge or a body sitting as a bench lacks impartiality, the standpoint of the person 
concerned is important but not decisive. What is decisive is whether this fear can be held to be 
objectively justified (see Micallef, cited above, § 96). 
 
77. The objective test mostly concerns hierarchical or other links between the judge and other 
protagonists in the proceedings (ibid., § 97). It must therefore be decided in each individual 
case whether the relationship in question is of such a nature and degree as to indicate a lack of 
impartiality on the part of the tribunal (see Pullar, cited above, § 38). 
 
78. In this connection even appearances may be of a certain importance or, in other words, 
“justice must not only be done, it must also be seen to be done” (see De Cubber, cited above, 
§ 26). What is at stake is the confidence which the courts in a democratic society must inspire 
in the public. Thus, any judge in respect of whom there is a legitimate reason to fear a lack of 
impartiality must withdraw (see Castillo Algar v. Spain, 28 October 1998, § 45, Reports 
1998-VIII, and Micallef, cited above, § 98). 
2. Application of those principles in the present case 
79. In the present case, the fear of a lack of impartiality lay in the fact that Judge J.M., who sat 
on the Court of Cassation bench which adopted the judgment of 10 December 2009, had 
expressed his support for Judge M. nine years earlier, in the context of disciplinary 
proceedings that had been brought against her on account of her conduct in the “Scientology” 
case. Speaking as a judge and a colleague in the same court, in the course of a general 
meeting of judges of the Paris tribunal de grande instance on 4 July 2000, at which he had 
subsequently voted in favour of the motion of support for Judge M., J.M. had stated: “We are 
not prohibited, as grassroots judges, from saying that we stand by Judge [M.] It is not 
forbidden to say that Judge [M.] has our support and trust.” (see paragraphs 27-28 above). 
 
80. The Grand Chamber notes at the outset that the applicant acknowledged in his 
observations that it was not established that Judge J.M. had displayed any personal bias 
against him. He argued merely that regardless of his personal conduct, the very presence of 
J.M. on the bench created a situation which rendered his fears objectively justified and 
legitimate (see paragraph 67 above). 
 
81. In the Court’s view, the case must therefore be examined from the perspective of the 
objective impartiality test, and more specifically it must address the question whether the 
applicant’s doubts, stemming from the specific situation, may be regarded as objectively 
justified in the circumstances of the case. 
 
82. Accordingly, the Court firstly takes the view that the language used by Judge J.M. in 
support of a fellow judge, Judge M., who was precisely responsible for the bringing of 
criminal proceedings against the applicant in the case now at issue, was capable of raising 
doubts in the defendant’s mind as to the impartiality of the “tribunal” hearing his case. 
 
83. Admittedly, the Government argued in their observations, among other things, that the 
remarks by J.M. were not sufficient to establish a lack of objective impartiality on his part, as 
they had been made a long time before and the words used reflected a personal position which 
concerned only the conditions in which the information about the bringing of disciplinary 
proceedings against a colleague of the same court had been forthcoming. 
 
84. The Court takes the view, however, that the very singular context of the case cannot be 
overlooked. It would first point out that the case concerned a lawyer and a judge, who had 
been serving in that capacity in connection with two judicial investigations in particularly 
high-profile cases: the Borrel case, in the context of which the applicant’s impugned remarks 
had been made, and the “Scientology” case, which had given rise to the remarks by J.M. It 
further notes, like the Chamber, that Judge M. was already conducting the investigation in the 
Borrel case, with its significant media coverage and political repercussions, when J.M. 
publicly expressed his support for her in the context of the “Scientology” case (see also 
paragraph 29 above). As emphasised by the Chamber, J.M. had then expressed his view in an 
official setting, at the general meeting of judges of the Paris tribunal de grande instance. 
 
85. The Court further observes that the applicant, who in both cases was the lawyer acting for 
civil parties who criticised the work of Judge M., was subsequently convicted on the basis of 
a complaint by the latter: accordingly, the professional conflict took on the appearance of a 
personal conflict, as Judge M. had applied to the domestic courts seeking redress for damage 
stemming from an offence that she accused the applicant of having committed. 
 
86. The Court would further emphasise, on that point, that the judgment of the Court of 
Appeal to which the case had been remitted itself expressly established a connection between 
the applicant’s remarks in the proceedings in question and the Scientology case, concluding 
that this suggested, on the part of the applicant, an “ex post facto settling of scores” and 
personal animosity towards Judge M., “with whom he had been in conflict in various cases” 
(see paragraph 50 above). 
 
87. It was precisely that judgment of the Court of Appeal which the applicant appealed 
against on points of law and which was examined by the bench of the Criminal Division of 
the Court of Cassation on which Judge J.M. sat. The Court does not agree with the 
Government’s argument to the effect that this situation does not raise any difficulty, since an 
appeal on points of law is an extraordinary remedy and the review by the Court of Cassation 
is limited solely to the observance of the law. 
 
88. In its case-law the Court has emphasised the crucial role of cassation proceedings, which 
form a special stage of the criminal proceedings with potentially decisive consequences for 
the accused, as in the present case, because if the case had been quashed it could have been 
remitted to a different court of appeal for a fresh examination of both the facts and the law. As 
the Court has stated on many occasions, Article 6 § 1 of the Convention does not compel the 
Contracting States to set up courts of appeal or of cassation, but a State which does institute 
such courts is required to ensure that persons having access to the law enjoy before such 
courts the fundamental guarantees in Article 6 (see, among other authorities, Delcourt v. 
Belgium, 17 January 1970, § 25, Series A no. 11; Omar v. France and Guérin v. France, 29 
July 1998, §§ 41 and 44 respectively, Reports 1998-V; and Louis v. France, no. 44301/02, § 
27, 14 November 2006), and this unquestionably includes the requirement that the court must 
be impartial. 
 
89. Lastly, the Court takes the view that the Government’s argument to the effect that J.M. 
was sitting on an enlarged bench comprising ten judges is not decisive for the objective 
impartiality issue under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. In view of the secrecy of the 
deliberations, it is impossible to ascertain J.M.’s actual influence on that occasion. Therefore, 
in the context thus described (see paragraphs 84-86 above), the impartiality of that court could 
have been open to genuine doubt. 
 
90. Furthermore, the applicant had not been informed that Judge J.M. would be sitting on the 
bench and had no reason to believe that he would do so. The Court notes that the applicant 
had, by contrast, been notified that the case would be examined by a reduced bench of the 
Criminal Division of the Court of Cassation, as is confirmed by the reporting judge’s report, 
the Court of Cassation’s on-line workflow for the case and three notices to parties, including 
two that were served after the date of the hearing (see paragraph 52 above). The applicant thus 
had no opportunity to challenge J.M.’s presence or to make any submissions on the issue of 
impartiality in that connection. 
 
91. Having regard to the foregoing, the Court finds that in the present case the applicant’s 
fears could have been considered objectively justified. 
 
92. The Court therefore concludes that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the 
Convention. 
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 10 OF THE CONVENTION 
93. The applicant alleged that his criminal conviction had entailed a violation of his right to 
freedom of expression as provided for by Article 10 of the Convention, which reads as 
follows: 
“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to 
receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. 
This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema 
enterprises. 
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such 
formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic 
society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or 
crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for 
preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality 
of the judiciary.” 
A. The Chamber judgment 
94. The Chamber found that there had been no violation of Article 10 of the Convention. It 
noted that the applicant had not confined himself to factual statements about the ongoing 
proceedings, but had accompanied them with value judgments which cast doubt on the 
impartiality and fairness of a judge. 
 
95. The Chamber, after noting that the investigating judge in question was no longer handling 
the case, took the view, firstly, that the applicant should have waited for the outcome of his 
request addressed the previous day to the Minister of Justice seeking an investigation by the 
General Inspectorate of Judicial Services into the alleged numerous shortcomings in the 
judicial investigation and, secondly, that the applicant had already successfully used a legal 
remedy to seek to cure any defects in the proceedings and the judge concerned by his remarks 
had been taken off the case. In view of the foregoing and the use of terms that the Chamber 
found particularly harsh, it took the view that the applicant had overstepped the limits that 
lawyers had to observe in publicly criticising the justice system. It added that its conclusion 
was reinforced by the seriousness of the accusations made in the article, and that, also having 
regard to the chronology of the events, it could be inferred that the applicant’s remarks were 
driven by a degree of personal animosity towards the judge. As to the “proportionality” of the 
sanction, the Chamber found that a fine of EUR 4,000 euros, together with an award of EUR 
7,500 in damages to each of the judges, did not appear excessive. 
B. The parties’ arguments before the Grand Chamber 
1. The applicant 
96. The applicant argued that the Court’s case-law guaranteed strong protection to the 
freedom of expression of lawyers, who played a key role in the administration of justice and 
the upholding of the rule of law, with any restriction having to remain exceptional. Such 
protection could be explained by two reasons: firstly, no particular circumstances could justify 
affording a wide margin of appreciation to States, bearing in mind that European and 
international texts, on the contrary, protected lawyers in their activity of defending their 
clients; secondly, their freedom of expression was linked to their clients’ right to a fair trial 
under Article 6 of the Convention. He further observed that the right of lawyers to make press 
statements as part of their clients’ defence was expressly acknowledged and that, in principle, 
there was, at European level, significant tolerance of lawyers’ criticism of judges, even when 
made in a public and media setting. He submitted, however, that the Chamber judgment 
highlighted some major uncertainties and vagaries in the case-law that affected the exercise of 
such freedom, especially outside the courtroom. He hoped that his case would enable the 
Grand Chamber to clarify the interpretation of the Convention on that point and to secure the 
protection of the lawyer’s speech. 
 
97. He proposed in this connection a formal approach to lawyers’ freedom of expression, 
based on the defence and interests of their clients, to ensure special protection in this context 
for the purposes of Article 10 of the Convention. Such an approach would also have the effect 
of dispelling the ambiguity surrounding the status of lawyers, who participated in the smooth 
running of the justice system but, on the other hand, did not have to adopt a conciliatory 
posture vis-à-vis that system and its members, as their primary role was to defend their clients. 
Being a key witness to the proceedings, lawyers should be afforded a functional protection 
that was not limited to the courtroom and was as broad as possible, in order to contribute 
effectively to defending their clients and informing the public. Such a functional approach 
would also make it possible to take effective action in response to any excesses and abuses 
committed by lawyers in breach of professional ethics and to preserve the necessary 
protection of judges from frivolous accusations. Any abuse of the primary purpose of the 
strengthened protection of the lawyer’s freedom of expression, namely to uphold the rights of 
the defence, could thus entail sanctions. 
 
98. In the present case, the applicant observed that his conviction could be regarded as an 
interference with the exercise of his right to freedom of expression. He did not dispute the fact 
that it was prescribed by law, namely by sections 23, 29 and 31 of the Law of 29 July 1881. 
 
99. Whilst he did not deny, either, that it pursued the legitimate aim of the protection of the 
reputation or rights of others, in his view the idea that the criminal proceedings against him 
sought to “maintain the authority and impartiality of the judiciary” should be seriously called 
into question, as the impugned remarks were, on the contrary, intended to strengthen, rather 
than undermine, such authority. The applicant further submitted that the Chamber had 
wrongly placed on the same footing, on the one hand, the freedom of expression of lawyers 
and the public’s right to be informed about matters of general interest, and on the other, the 
dignity of the legal profession and the good reputation of judges; while the former were rights 
guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention, the latter were merely interests that might 
warrant a restriction, which had to remain exceptional. 
 
100. As to the interference and whether it was necessary in a democratic society, the applicant 
took the view that it did not correspond to any pressing social need and that it was not 
proportionate to the aims pursued. 
 
101. The argument that there was no pressing social need was mainly supported by the 
context in which the remarks were made, because the case had received significant media 
coverage, as the Court had previously noted in its July and SARL Libération judgment (no. 
20893/03, ECHR 2008) and as confirmed by the Chamber in paragraph 76 of its judgment. In 
addition, the status of the victim, the place and circumstances of his death, the diplomatic 
ramifications of the case, and the suspicions that the current President of the Republic of 
Djibouti might have been involved as the instigator, all showed that the case concerned a 
matter of general interest requiring strong protection of freedom of expression. Moreover, on 
19 June 2007 the Paris public prosecutor had issued a press release stating that the theory of 
suicide had now been discounted in favour of a criminal explanation. That statement had been 
made at the request of the investigating judge under Article 11, paragraph 3, of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure (permitting the public disclosure of details about the case to avoid the 
dissemination of incomplete or inaccurate information, or to put an end to a breach of public 
order). The case was so sensitive that the investigation was now being handled by three 
investigating judges. 
 
102. The applicant argued that the remarks about the shortcomings in the justice system, in 
the context of the lawyer’s duty to defend a client, could be deemed to merit even stronger 
protection. He denied going beyond the limits of permissible criticism: his comments 
concerned only the professional conduct of Judges M. and L.L., which was so crucial for the 
civil parties; the remarks had a sufficient factual basis which lay in two proven facts, firstly, 
the fact that the video-cassette at issue had not been transmitted to the new investigating judge 
with the rest of the case file and, secondly, the existence of the handwritten card from the 
prosecutor of Djibouti to Judge M.; moreover, the proceedings brought against the applicant 
and his colleague Mr de Caunes by Judges M. and L.L. for false accusation, following the 
letter sent by the lawyers to the Minister of Justice, had resulted in a discontinuance order, 
which had been upheld on appeal. 
 
103. As to the accusation that he had shown personal animosity, the applicant rejected this, 
pointing out that only the content and subject of the impugned remarks should be taken into 
account, not any intentions that might be wrongly attributed to him. The applicant added that 
he was not responsible for the reference to the disciplinary proceedings pending against Judge 
M. and he noted that, in any event, Judge L.L. had also lodged a criminal complaint, without 
there being any suggestion of personal animosity towards that judge as well. The applicant 
also denied that any insults or abuse could be detected in the remarks published in Le Monde. 
Lastly, he submitted that he was merely defending his client’s position in public, keeping her 
interests in mind without going beyond the scope of his duty of defence. He was of the view, 
in that connection, that this could not have influenced the ministerial or judicial authorities 
and he moreover challenged the idea that legal action by a lawyer on behalf of his client 
should preclude any comments in the press where the case aroused public interest. He asserted 
that, on the contrary, a lawyer was entitled to decide freely on his defence strategy for the 
benefit of his client. 
 
104. Lastly, the applicant submitted that the sanction imposed had been particularly 
disproportionate. The criminal sanction had consisted of a fine of EUR 4,000, which was 
higher than the fine imposed on the journalist and director of Le Monde (respectively EUR 
3,000 and EUR 1,500). In the civil part of the judgment, in addition to the sums awarded to 
cover the costs of Judges M. and L.L., he had been ordered to pay, jointly with his co-
defendants, EUR 7,500 in damages to each of the two judges. Lastly, the publication of a 
notice in Le Monde, with a fine of EUR 500 per day in the event of delay, had been ordered. 
He submitted that such sanctions were unjustified and disproportionate and that they would 
inevitably have a significant and regrettable chilling effect on all lawyers. 
2. The Government 
105. The Government did not deny that the applicant’s conviction constituted an interference 
with the exercise of his right to freedom of expression. They took the view, however, that this 
interference was prescribed by law, since its legal basis lay in section 23 and section 29 et seq. 
of the Law of 29 July 1881, and that it pursued a legitimate aim. On that latter point they 
argued that it sought to maintain the authority and impartiality of the judiciary, and to ensure 
the protection of the reputation or rights of others, since the statements had been directed at 
judges in the exercise of their duties and also undermined the confidence of citizens in the 
judiciary. 
 
106. As to whether the interference was necessary in a democratic society, the Government 
were of the view that there was a fundamental difference between lawyers and journalists 
because of the former’s position as officers of the court (auxiliaires de justice). They occupied 
a central position as intermediaries between the public and the courts and their activities 
helped to ensure that justice was administered effectively and dispassionately. A balance had 
to be struck between the legitimate aim of informing the public about matters of general 
interest, including issues relating to the functioning of the justice system, and the 
requirements stemming from the proper administration of justice, on the one hand, and the 
dignity of the legal profession and the reputation of the judiciary, on the other. 
107. The Government noted two different situations in the Court’s case-law on freedom of 
expression: the participation of lawyers in debates on matters of general interest unrelated to 
any pending proceedings, where freedom of expression was particularly broad; and statements 
made by lawyers in their role of defending clients, where they had a wide freedom of 
expression in the courtroom. That freedom of expression in defending a client in pending 
proceedings did have certain limits, however, in order to preserve judicial authority, such as, 
for example, where the lawyer made statements critical of the justice system before even 
using the legal remedies available to him to rectify the shortcomings in question. The 
Government submitted that lawyers, as officers of the court, were thus obliged to use legal 
proceedings to correct any alleged errors; by contrast, harsh criticism in the press, where legal 
means could be used instead, was not justified by the requirements of the effective defence of 
the lawyer’s client and cast doubt on the probity of the justice system. 
 
108. In the present case the Government took the view that there had been numerous possible 
judicial remedies open to the applicant for the effective defence of his client and that he had in 
fact made use of them. His statements in the media could therefore only have been for the 
purpose of informing the public about a subject of general interest, but, as they concerned an 
ongoing case, he should have spoken with moderation. 
 
109. In examining the impugned remarks, the Government referred to the margin of 
appreciation afforded to States in such matters. The article in question concerned a 
particularly sensitive case which, from the outset, had received significant media coverage. In 
their view, it could be seen from the article in Le Monde that the offending remarks were 
aimed, unequivocally, at the two judges and were phrased in terms that impugned their 
honour. The applicant had not confined himself to a general criticism of the institutions but 
had expressed biased views, without the slightest prudence. In the Government’s submission, 
he had not made factual statements about the functioning of the judicial system, but rather 
value judgments that cast serious doubt on the investigating judges’ integrity. The 
Government stated that the domestic courts had carefully examined each of the statements in 
question to establish whether they went beyond the limits of acceptable criticism. They 
further submitted that the evidence produced by the applicant was devoid of probative value. 
 
110. Concerning the applicant’s unsuccessful defence of good faith, based on the duties 
inherent in his responsibility to defend his client’s interests, the Government observed that the 
French courts had assessed good faith in the light of Article 10 of the Convention and the four 
criteria that had to be fulfilled concurrently: the legitimacy of the aim pursued, the absence of 
personal animosity, the seriousness of the investigation carried out or of the evidence obtained 
by the author of the comments, and lastly, the prudence shown in expressing them. The 
domestic courts had taken the view that those conditions had not been fulfilled in the present 
case and had regarded the applicant’s remarks as a settling of scores with a judge. The 
applicant was at fault not for expressing himself outside the courtroom, but for using 
excessive comments, whereas he could have expressed himself without impugning the honour 
of State officials. 
111. The Government submitted that such attacks on judges did not contribute either to a clear 
public understanding of the issues, since the judicial authority had no right of reply, or to the 
proper conduct of the judicial proceedings in a context in which the investigating judge who 
was the subject of the harsh criticism had already been removed from the case. In their view, 
neither was it a matter of zealous defence by a lawyer of his client, because there were 
judicial remedies that he could have used to submit his complaint. The Government referred 
to the Court’s inadmissibility decision in the case of Floquet and Esménard v. France (no. 
29064/08, 10 January 2002), which concerned comments made by journalists in the Borrel 
case, particularly as, in the present case, it was not a journalist but a lawyer who was the 
author of the impugned statements, and moreover in a case that was pending in the domestic 
courts. 
 
112. As to the sanction imposed on the applicant, the Government were of the view that it 
could not be regarded as excessive or such as to have a chilling effect on the exercise of 
freedom of expression. They thus submitted that there had been no violation of Article 10 of 
the Convention. 
C. Observations of third parties intervening before the Grand Chamber 
1. Observations of the Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe (CCBE) 
113. The CCBE observed that the Court’s judgment in the present case would most certainly 
have a considerable impact on the conditions of interpretation and application of the standards 
of conduct imposed on European lawyers and more particularly with regard to their freedom 
of speech and expression in the context of the exercise of defence rights. Lawyers held a key 
position in the administration of justice and it was necessary to protect their specific status. 
Being the cornerstone of a democratic society, freedom of expression had a particular 
characteristic as regards lawyers, who had to be able to carry on their profession without 
hindrance; if the use of their speech were to be censored or restricted, the real and effective 
defence of the citizen would not be guaranteed. 
 
114. The CCBE referred to the Court’s case-law to the effect that a restriction of freedom of 
expression would entail a violation of Article 10 unless it fell within the exceptions mentioned 
in paragraph 2 of that Article. The examination criteria related to the existence of an 
interference, its legal foreseeability, whether it was necessary in a democratic society to meet 
a “pressing social need” and the specific circumstances of the case. In the CCBE’s view, these 
criteria were all the more valid where a lawyer defending Convention rights was concerned. 
 
115. The limits to freedom of expression firstly had to be reasonably foreseeable, with a more 
restrictive and precise definition of the criteria relating to the restrictions that could be placed 
on lawyers’ freedom of expression. The CCBE noted discrepancies in the assessment by the 
various Sections of the Court: in a related case (July and SARL Libération, cited above) the 
Court had found a violation of Article 10, whereas the Chamber in the present case had found 
no violation. In the CCBE’s view such discrepancies in assessment appeared to be the result 
of different approaches to the remarks of a lawyer: a degree of immunity applied to any 
views, however harsh, about the justice system or a court, whilst criticism of a judge did not 
enjoy such immunity. Such a distinction was extremely difficult to apply and gave rise to 
almost insurmountable problems, on account of the interdependence between the general and 
the personal in the conduct of proceedings, together with the fact that, in an inquisitorial 
system, judicial office could not be separated from the institution itself. 
 
116. As the present case concerned freedom of expression outside the courtroom, the limits 
also had to take account of the fact that in sensitive and high-profile cases, and especially in 
those where reasons of State were at stake, lawyers often had no choice but to speak publicly 
to voice concerns about a hindrance to the proper conduct of the proceedings. In such cases, 
lawyers should have the same freedom of speech and expression as journalists. To restrict 
their freedom of expression, particularly when the proceedings were part of an inquisitorial 
system as in France, would prevent them from contributing to the proper administration of 
justice and ensuring public confidence therein. 
 
117. The CCBE observed that as soon as a case attracted media attention, and, more 
particularly, where reasons of State were at stake, the rights of the defence, in certain cases, 
could only be meaningfully safeguarded by means of a public statement, even one that was 
somewhat vocal. Referring to the Court’s findings in Mor v. France (no. 28198/09, § 42, 15 
December 2011), it took the view that the fact that neither the competent judicial authority nor 
the professional disciplinary body had initiated proceedings would provide a foreseeable test 
in relation to the uncertainties surrounding any inappropriate action by a judge, whose office 
could not be distinguished from the judicial authority itself. 
2. Joint observations of the Paris Bar Association, the National Bar Council and the 
Conference of Chairmen of French Bars 
118. These third parties pointed out, first, that until recently the issue of a lawyer’s freedom of 
speech had arisen only inside the courtroom, and that in the context of defending a client at a 
hearing, the lawyer was protected by immunity from legal proceedings, an immunity which 
covered judicial writing and speech, under section 41 of the Law of 29 July 1881. This 
immunity authorised remarks which could be considered offensive, defamatory or injurious. 
 
119. In their view, the point of principle in the present case was the lawyer’s freedom of 
expression to defend his client when he was addressing the press, where the case had attracted 
a certain level of public interest. The resulting issue was how to determine when comments 
became excessive, however strong they might be, if they affected an opponent, a judge or a 
fellow lawyer. 
 
120. Every lawyer, however well known, was the custodian of the client’s word. When a case 
came to public attention, it was the lawyer’s responsibility to continue to defend that client, 
whether by taking any necessary ad hoc proceedings or by adding his own voice to the media 
storm, as had become the norm. This was no longer a lawyer’s right but a duty attached to his 
position, whether the story of the case broke some time before any public hearing, as was 
often the case, or later. 
 
121. Lawyers were entitled to criticise the court’s ruling and to relay any criticism their 
clients might wish to make. The lawyer’s comments were then necessarily interpreted and 
received by the public as partial and subjective. The parallel between the judge’s duty of 
discretion and the lawyer’s freedom of speech was not convincing. Whilst the word of the 
judge would be received as objective, the words of the lawyer were taken as the expression of 
a protest by a party. It was not unusual, therefore, for a judge to be obliged to remain silent, 
whilst comments by a lawyer, for a party to the proceedings, would in no way disrupt the 
independence and authority of the justice system. 
 
122. The third parties observed that, while the French courts had always strictly applied the 
immunity referred to in section 41 of the 1881 Law to judicial comments alone, they were not 
unaware that lawyers had to contend with certain developments when their cases attracted 
media attention. They cited a recent example from a high-profile case where a lawyer had 
been prosecuted for defaming a lawyer for the opposing party. The Paris tribunal de grande 
instance had accepted his plea of good faith, even though his comments had been particularly 
excessive and based only on his personal belief, as “they came from a passionate lawyer who 
dedicated all his energies to defending his client and who could not restrict his freedom of 
expression on the sole ground that he was referring to his case in front of journalists rather 
than addressing judges” (final judgment of the Seventeenth Division of the Paris tribunal de 
grande instance of 20 October 2010). The distinction between judicial and extrajudicial 
expression had therefore become outdated. The word of a lawyer was in fact based on a duty 
to inform; like journalists, lawyers were also “watchdogs of democracy”. 
 
123. The third parties submitted, lastly, that there was an obligation of proportionality in such 
matters both for lawyers and for the State. Lawyers had a very difficult role and this duty of 
proportionality reflected their duties of sensitivity and moderation, from which they could 
depart only where this was justified by the defence of his client and by the attacks or pressure 
they were under. As regards the State, the third parties were of the view that lawyers should 
normally be granted immunity where their comments, however excessive, were linked to the 
defence of their client’s interests. Any restriction on their right to express their views should 
be exceptional, the test being whether or not the comments were detachable from the defence 
of the client. The margin of freedom of expression for lawyers, which had to remain as broad 
as that of journalists, should take account of the constraints faced by them and the increased 
media attention, with a press that was increasingly curious and probing. 
D. The Court’s assessment 
1. General principles 
(a) Freedom of expression 
124. The general principles concerning the necessity of an interference with freedom of 
expression, reiterated many times by the Court since its judgment in Handyside v. the United 
Kingdom (7 December 1976, Series A no. 24), were summarised in Stoll v. Switzerland ([GC] 
no. 69698/01, § 101, ECHR 2007-V) and restated more recently in Animal Defenders 
International v. the United Kingdom ([GC], no. 48876/08, § 100, ECHR 2013), as follows: 
“(i) Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society and one of the 
basic conditions for its progress and for each individual’s self-fulfilment. Subject to paragraph 2 of Article 10, it 
is applicable not only to ‘information’ or ‘ideas’ that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a 
matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb. Such are the demands of pluralism, 
tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no ‘democratic society’. As set forth in Article 10, this 
freedom is subject to exceptions, which ... must, however, be construed strictly, and the need for any restrictions 
must be established convincingly ... 
(ii) The adjective ‘necessary’, within the meaning of Article 10 § 2, implies the existence of a ‘pressing social 
need’. The Contracting States have a certain margin of appreciation in assessing whether such a need exists, but 
it goes hand in hand with European supervision, embracing both the legislation and the decisions applying it, 
even those given by an independent court. The Court is therefore empowered to give the final ruling on whether 
a ‘restriction’ is reconcilable with freedom of expression as protected by Article 10. 
(iii) The Court’s task, in exercising its supervisory jurisdiction, is not to take the place of the competent national 
authorities but rather to review under Article 10 the decisions they delivered pursuant to their power of 
appreciation. This does not mean that the supervision is limited to ascertaining whether the respondent State 
exercised its discretion reasonably, carefully and in good faith; what the Court has to do is to look at the 
interference complained of in the light of the case as a whole and determine whether it was ‘proportionate to the 
legitimate aim pursued’ and whether the reasons adduced by the national authorities to justify it are ‘relevant and 
sufficient’ ... In doing so, the Court has to satisfy itself that the national authorities applied standards which were 
in conformity with the principles embodied in Article 10 and, moreover, that they relied on an acceptable 
assessment of the relevant facts ...” 
125. Moreover, as regards the level of protection, there is little scope under Article 10 § 2 of 
the Convention for restrictions on political speech or on debate on matters of public interest 
(see Sürek v. Turkey (no. 1) [GC], no. 26682/95, § 61, ECHR 1999-IV; Lindon, Otchakovsky-
Laurens and July v. France [GC], nos. 21279/02 and 36448/02, § 46, ECHR 2007-IV; and 
Axel Springer AG v. Germany [GC], no. 39954/08, § 90, ECHR 2012). Accordingly, a high 
level of protection of freedom of expression, with the authorities thus having a particularly 
narrow margin of appreciation, will normally be accorded where the remarks concern a matter 
of public interest, as is the case, in particular, for remarks on the functioning of the judiciary, 
even in the context of proceedings that are still pending in respect of the other defendants (see 
Roland Dumas v. France, no. 34875/07, § 43, 15 July 2010, and Gouveia Gomes Fernandes 
and Freitas e Costa v. Portugal, no. 1529/08, § 47, 29 March 2011). A degree of hostility (see 
E.K. v. Turkey, no. 28496/95, §§ 79-80, 7 February 2002) and the potential seriousness of 
certain remarks (see Thoma v. Luxembourg, no. 38432/97, § 57, ECHR 2001-III) do not 
obviate the right to a high level of protection, given the existence of a matter of public interest 
(see Paturel v. France, no. 54968/00, § 42, 22 December 2005). 
 
126. Furthermore, in its judgments in Lingens (Lingens v. Austria, 8 July 1986, § 46, Series A 
no. 10) and Oberschlick (Oberschlick v. Austria (no. 1), 23 May 1991, § 63, Series A no. 
204), the Court drew a distinction between statements of fact and value judgments. The 
existence of facts can be demonstrated, whereas the truth of value judgments is not 
susceptible of proof. The requirement to prove the truth of a value judgment is impossible to 
fulfil and infringes freedom of opinion itself, which is a fundamental part of the right secured 
by Article 10 (see De Haes and Gijsels v. Belgium, 24 February 1997, § 42, Reports 1997-I). 
However, where a statement amounts to a value judgment, the proportionality of an 
interference may depend on whether there exists a sufficient “factual basis” for the impugned 
statement: if there is not, that value judgment may prove excessive (see De Haes and Gijsels, 
cited above, § 47; Oberschlick v. Austria (no. 2), 1 July 1997, § 33, Reports 1997-IV; 
Brasilier v. France, no. 71343/01, § 36, 11 April 2006; and Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens 
and July, cited above, § 55). In order to distinguish between a factual allegation and a value 
judgment it is necessary to take account of the circumstances of the case and the general tone 
of the remarks (see Brasilier, cited above, § 37), bearing in mind that assertions about matters 
of public interest may, on that basis, constitute value judgments rather than statements of fact 
(see Paturel, cited above, § 37). 
 
127. Lastly, the nature and severity of the sanctions imposed are also factors to be taken into 
account when assessing the proportionality of the interference. As the Court has previously 
pointed out, interference with freedom of expression may have a chilling effect on the 
exercise of that freedom. The relatively moderate nature of the fines does not suffice to negate 
the risk of a chilling effect on the exercise of freedom of expression, this being all the more 
unacceptable in the case of a lawyer who is required to ensure the effective defence of his 
clients (see Mor, cited above, § 61). Generally speaking, while it is legitimate for the 
institutions of the State, as guarantors of the institutional public order, to be protected by the 
competent authorities, the dominant position occupied by those institutions requires the 
authorities to display restraint in resorting to criminal proceedings (see Castells v. Spain, 23 
April 1992, § 46, Series A no. 236; Incal v. Turkey [GC], 9 June 1998, § 54, Reports 1998-IV; 
Lehideux and Isorni v. France, 23 September 1998, § 57, Reports 1998-VII; Öztürk v. Turkey 
[GC], 28 September 1999, § 66, ECHR 1999-VI; and Otegi Mondragon v. Spain, no. 
2034/07, § 58, ECHR 2011). 
(b) Maintaining the authority of the judiciary 
128. Questions concerning the functioning of the justice system, an institution that is essential 
for any democratic society, fall within the public interest. In this connection, regard must be 
had to the special role of the judiciary in society. As the guarantor of justice, a fundamental 
value in a law-governed State, it must enjoy public confidence if it is to be successful in 
carrying out its duties. It may therefore prove necessary to protect such confidence against 
gravely damaging attacks that are essentially unfounded, especially in view of the fact that 
judges who have been criticised are subject to a duty of discretion that precludes them from 
replying (see Prager and Oberschlick v. Austria, 26 April 1995, § 34, Series A no. 313; 
Karpetas v. Greece, no. 6086/10, § 68, 30 October 2012; and Di Giovanni v. Italy, no. 
51160/06, § 71, 9 July 2013). 
 
129. The phrase “authority of the judiciary” includes, in particular, the notion that the courts 
are, and are accepted by the public at large as being, the proper forum for the resolution of 
legal disputes and for the determination of a person’s guilt or innocence on a criminal charge; 
further, that the public at large have respect for and confidence in the courts’ capacity to fulfil 
that function (see Worm v. Austria, 29 August 1997, § 40, Reports 1997-V, and Prager and 
Oberschlick, cited above). 
 
130. What is at stake is the confidence which the courts in a democratic society must inspire 
not only in the accused, as far as criminal proceedings are concerned (see Kyprianou, cited 
above, § 172), but also in the public at large (see Kudeshkina v. Russia, no. 29492/05, § 86, 26 
February 2009, and Di Giovanni, cited above). 
 
131. Nevertheless – save in the case of gravely damaging attacks that are essentially 
unfounded – bearing in mind that judges form part of a fundamental institution of the State, 
they may as such be subject to personal criticism within the permissible limits, and not only in 
a theoretical and general manner (see July and SARL Libération, cited above, § 74). When 
acting in their official capacity they may thus be subject to wider limits of acceptable criticism 
than ordinary citizens (see, in particular, July and SARL Libération, cited above). 
(c) The status and freedom of expression of lawyers 
132. The specific status of lawyers gives them a central position in the administration of 
justice as intermediaries between the public and the courts. They therefore play a key role in 
ensuring that the courts, whose mission is fundamental in a State based on the rule of law, 
enjoy public confidence (see Schöpfer v. Switzerland, 20 May 1998, §§ 29-30, Reports 1998-
III; Nikula v. Finland, no. 31611/96, § 45, ECHR 2002-II; Amihalachioaie v. Moldova, no. 
60115/00, § 27, ECHR 2004-III; Kyprianou, cited above, § 173; André and Another v. 
France, no. 18603/03, § 42, 24 July 2008; and Mor, cited above, § 42). However, for 
members of the public to have confidence in the administration of justice they must have 
confidence in the ability of the legal profession to provide effective representation (see 
Kyprianou, cited above, § 175). 
 
133. That special role of lawyers, as independent professionals, in the administration of 
justice entails a number of duties, particularly with regard to their conduct (see Van der 
Mussele v. Belgium, 23 November 1983, Series A no. 70; Casado Coca v. Spain, 24 February 
1994, § 46, Series A no. 285-A; Steur v. the Netherlands, no. 39657/98, § 38, ECHR 2003-XI; 
Veraart v. the Netherlands, no. 10807/04, § 51, 30 November 2006; and Coutant v. France 
(dec.), no. 17155/03, 24 January 2008). Whilst they are subject to restrictions on their 
professional conduct, which must be discreet, honest and dignified, they also enjoy exclusive 
rights and privileges that may vary from one jurisdiction to another – among them, usually, a 
certain latitude regarding arguments used in court (see Steur, cited above). 
 
134. Consequently, freedom of expression is applicable also to lawyers. It encompasses not 
only the substance of the ideas and information expressed but also the form in which they are 
conveyed (see Foglia v Switzerland, no. 35865/04, § 85, 13 December 2007). Lawyers are 
thus entitled, in particular, to comment in public on the administration of justice, provided that 
their criticism does not overstep certain bounds (see Amihalachioaie, cited above, §§ 27-28; 
Foglia, cited above, § 86; and Mor, cited above, § 43). Those bounds lie in the usual 
restrictions on the conduct of members of the Bar (see Kyprianou, cited above, § 173), as 
reflected in the ten basic principles enumerated by the CCBE for European lawyers, with their 
particular reference to “dignity”, “honour” and “integrity” and to “respect for ... the fair 
administration of justice” (see paragraph 58 above). Such rules contribute to the protection of 
the judiciary from gratuitous and unfounded attacks, which may be driven solely by a wish or 
strategy to ensure that the judicial debate is pursued in the media or to settle a score with the 
judges handling the particular case. 
 
135. The question of freedom of expression is related to the independence of the legal 
profession, which is crucial for the effective functioning of the fair administration of justice 
(see Sialkowska v. Poland, no. 8932/05, § 111, 22 March 2007). It is only in exceptional cases 
that restriction – even by way of a lenient criminal penalty – of defence counsel’s freedom of 
expression can be accepted as necessary in a democratic society (see Nikula, cited above, § 
55; Kyprianou, cited above, § 174; and Mor, cited above, § 44). 
 
136. A distinction should, however, be drawn depending on whether the lawyer expresses 
himself in the courtroom or elsewhere. 
 
137. As regards, firstly, the issue of “conduct in the courtroom”, since the lawyer’s freedom 
of expression may raise a question as to his client’s right to a fair trial, the principle of 
fairness thus also militates in favour of a free and even forceful exchange of argument 
between the parties (see Nikula, cited above, § 49, and Steur, cited above, § 37). Lawyers 
have the duty to “defend their clients’ interests zealously” (see Nikula, cited above, § 54), 
which means that they sometimes have to decide whether or not they should object to or 
complain about the conduct of the court (see Kyprianou, cited above, § 175). In addition, the 
Court takes into consideration the fact that the impugned remarks are not repeated outside the 
courtroom and it makes a distinction depending on the person concerned; thus, a prosecutor, 
who is a “party” to the proceedings, has to “tolerate very considerable criticism by ... defence 
counsel”, even if some of the terms are inappropriate, provided they do not concern his 
general professional or other qualities (see Nikula, cited above, §§ 51-52; Foglia, cited above, 
§ 95; and Roland Dumas, cited above, § 48). 
 
138. Turning now to remarks made outside the courtroom, the Court reiterates that the 
defence of a client may be pursued by means of an appearance on the television news or a 
statement in the press, and through such channels the lawyer may inform the public about 
shortcomings that are likely to undermine pre-trial proceedings (see Mor, cited above, § 59). 
The Court takes the view, in this connection, that a lawyer cannot be held responsible for 
everything published in the form of an “interview”, in particular where the press has edited 
the statements and he or she has denied making certain remarks (see Amihalachioaie, cited 
above, § 37). In the above-cited Foglia case, it also found that lawyers could not justifiably be 
held responsible for the actions of the press (see Foglia, cited above, § 97). Similarly, where a 
case is widely covered in the media on account of the seriousness of the facts and the 
individuals likely to be implicated, a lawyer cannot be penalised for breaching the secrecy of 
the judicial investigation where he or she has merely made personal comments on information 
which is already known to the journalists and which they intend to report, with or without 
those comments. Nevertheless, when making public statements, a lawyer is not exempted 
from his duty of prudence in relation to the secrecy of a pending judicial investigation (see 
Mor, cited above, §§ 55 and 56). 
 
139. Lawyers cannot, moreover, make remarks that are so serious that they overstep the 
permissible expression of comments without a sound factual basis (see Karpetas, cited above, 
§ 78; see also A v. Finland (dec.), no. 44998/98, 8 January 2004), nor can they proffer insults 
(see Coutant (dec.), cited above). In the circumstances of the Gouveia Gomes Fernandes and 
Freitas e Costa case, the use of a tone that was not insulting but caustic, or even sarcastic, in 
remarks about judges was regarded as compatible with Article 10 (see Gouveia Gomes 
Fernandes and Freitas e Costa, cited above, § 48). The Court assesses remarks in their 
general context, in particular to ascertain whether they can be regarded as misleading or as a 
gratuitous personal attack (see Ormanni v. Italy, no. 30278/04, § 73, 17 July 2007, and 
Gouveia Gomes Fernandes and Freitas e Costa, cited above, § 51) and to ensure that the 
expressions used had a sufficiently close connection with the facts of the case (see Feldek v. 
Slovakia, no. 29032/95, § 86, ECHR 2001-VIII, and Gouveia Gomes Fernandes and Freitas e 
Costa, cited above). 
2. Application of those principles in the present case 
140. Turning to the present case, the Court observes that the applicant received a criminal 
conviction, with an order to pay damages and costs, on account of his remarks concerning the 
proceedings in the Borrel case, as reproduced in an article in the daily newspaper Le Monde, 
which contained the text of a letter sent by the applicant and his colleague to the Minister of 
Justice seeking an administrative investigation, together with statements that he had made to 
the journalist who wrote the impugned article. 
141. The Court notes at the outset that it is not in dispute between the parties that the 
applicant’s criminal conviction constituted an interference with the exercise of his right to 
freedom of expression, as guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention. That is also the Court’s 
opinion. 
 
142. It further observes that the interference was prescribed by law, namely by sections 23, 29 
and 31 of the Law of 29 July 1881, as the applicant acknowledged. 
 
143. The parties also agreed that the aim of the interference was the protection of the 
reputation or rights of others. The Court does not see any reason to adopt a different view. 
While the applicant wished to qualify the point that the proceedings against him also sought to 
“maintain the authority and impartiality of the judiciary” (see paragraph 99 above), this 
question relates to the “necessity” of the interference and cannot affect the fact that it pursued 
at least one of the “legitimate aims” covered by paragraph 2 of Article 10. 
 
144. It remains therefore to be examined whether the interference was “necessary in a 
democratic society” and this requires the Court to ascertain whether it was proportionate to 
the legitimate aim pursued and whether the grounds given by the domestic courts were 
relevant and sufficient. 
 
145. The Court notes that, in convicting the applicant, the Court of Appeal took the view that 
to say that an investigating judge had shown “conduct which [was] completely at odds with 
the principles of impartiality and fairness” was in itself a particularly defamatory accusation 
(see paragraph 47 above). That court added that the applicant’s comments concerning the 
delay in forwarding the video-cassette and his reference to the handwritten card from the 
public prosecutor of Djibouti to Judge M., in respect of which the applicant had used the term 
“connivance”, merely confirmed the defamatory nature of the accusation (ibid.), the 
“veracity” of the allegations not having been established (see paragraph 48 above) and the 
applicant’s defence of good faith being rejected (see paragraph 49 above). 
(a) The applicant’s status as a lawyer 
146. The Court first observes that the remarks in question stemmed both from statements 
made at the request of the journalist who wrote the article and from the letter to the Minister 
of Justice. The remarks were made by the applicant in his capacity as lawyer acting for the 
civil party and concerned matters relating to the proceedings in the Borrel case. 
 
147. In this connection the Court notes at the outset that the applicant has invited it to clarify 
its case-law concerning the exercise of freedom of expression by a lawyer, particularly 
outside the courtroom, and to afford the greatest possible protection to comments by lawyers 
(see paragraphs 96, 97 and 102 above). The Government, for their part, while taking the view 
that their status as officers of the court fundamentally distinguished lawyers from journalists 
(see paragraph 106 above), identified various situations in which freedom of expression 
would be “particularly broad”, “wide”, or, on the contrary, subject to “certain limits” (see 
paragraph 107 above). 
 
148. The Court would refer the parties to the principles set out in its case-law, particularly 
with regard to the status and freedom of expression of lawyers (see paragraphs 132-139 
above), with emphasis on the need to distinguish between remarks made by lawyers inside 
and outside the courtroom. Moreover, in view of the specific status of lawyers and their 
position in the administration of justice (see paragraph 132 above), the Court takes the view, 
contrary to the argument of the CCBE (see paragraph 116 above), that lawyers cannot be 
equated with journalists. Their respective positions and roles in judicial proceedings are 
intrinsically different. Journalists have the task of imparting, in conformity with their duties 
and responsibilities, information and ideas on all matters of public interest, including those 
relating to the administration of justice. Lawyers, for their part, are protagonists in the justice 
system, directly involved in its functioning and in the defence of a party. They cannot 
therefore be equated with an external witnesses whose task it is to inform the public. 
 
149. The applicant argued that his statements, as published in the newspaper Le Monde, 
served precisely to fulfil his task of defending his client – a task that was for him to 
determine. However, while it is not in dispute that the impugned remarks fell within the 
context of the proceedings, they were aimed at investigating judges who had been removed 
from the proceedings with final effect at the time they were made. The Court therefore fails to 
see how his statements could have directly contributed to his task of defending his client, 
since the judicial investigation had by that time been entrusted to another judge who was not 
the subject of the criticism. 
(b) Contribution to a debate on a matter of public interest 
150. The applicant further relied on his right to inform the public about shortcomings in the 
handling of ongoing proceedings and to contribute to a debate on a matter of public interest. 
 
151. On that point, the Court notes firstly that the applicant’s remarks were made in the 
context of the judicial investigation opened following the death of a French judge, Bernard 
Borrel, who had been seconded to the Djibouti Ministry of Justice as a technical adviser. The 
Court has already had occasion to note the significant media interest shown in this case from 
the outset (see July and SARL Libération, cited above, § 67), thus reflecting its prominence in 
public opinion. Like the applicant, the Court notes, moreover, that the justice system also 
contributed to informing the public about this case, as the investigating judge handling the 
case in 2007 asked the public prosecutor to issue a press release, under Article 11, paragraph 
3, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to announce that the suicide theory had been dismissed 
in favour of one of premeditated murder (see paragraphs 24 and 55 above). 
 
152. In addition, as the Court has previously found, the public have a legitimate interest in the 
provision and availability of information about criminal proceedings (see July and SARL 
Libération, cited above, § 66) and remarks concerning the functioning of the judiciary relate 
to a matter of public interest (see paragraph 125 above). The Court has in fact already been 
called upon on two occasions, in Floquet and Esménard and July and SARL Libération (both 
cited above), to examine complaints relating to the Borrel case and to the right to freedom of 
expression in respect of comments on the handling of the judicial investigation, finding in 
each of those cases that there was a debate on a matter of public interest. 
 
153. Accordingly, the Court takes the view that the applicant’s impugned remarks, which also 
concerned, as in the said cases of Floquet and Esménard and July and SARL Libération, the 
functioning of the judiciary and the handling of the Borrel case, fell within the context of a 
debate on a matter of public interest, thus calling for a high level of protection of freedom of 
expression, with a particularly narrow margin of appreciation accordingly being afforded to 
the authorities. 
(c) The nature of the impugned remarks 
154. The Court notes that after the applicant’s remarks had been found “particularly 
defamatory”, he had been unable to establish their veracity on the basis of evidence that, 
according to the Criminal Court, had to “be flawless and complete and relate directly to all the 
allegations found to be defamatory” (see paragraph 40 above). His defence of good faith was 
also rejected. On that point, the Criminal Court and the Court of Appeal took the view, in 
particular, that the attacks on the professional and moral integrity of Judges M. and L.L. 
clearly overstepped the right of permissible criticism (see paragraphs 40 and 50 above). In 
addition, while the Criminal Court took the view that the profound disagreements between 
Mrs Borrel’s lawyers and the investigating judges could not justify a total lack of prudence in 
their expression, the Court of Appeal concluded that the decision in the applicant’s favour to 
discontinue the proceedings brought against him by the two judges did not rule out bad faith 
on his part. It held that the applicant’s personal animosity and the wish to discredit the judges, 
in particular Judge M., stemmed from the excessive nature of his comments and from the fact 
that the article on the Borrel case had been published at the same time as the bringing of 
proceedings against Judge M. before the Indictment Division in connection with the 
Scientology case (ibid.). 
 
155. As the Court has already observed, it is necessary to distinguish between statements of 
fact and value judgments (see paragraph 126 above). The existence of facts can be 
demonstrated, whereas the truth of value judgments is not susceptible of proof; a requirement 
to prove the truth of a value judgment is impossible to fulfil and infringes freedom of opinion 
itself, which is a fundamental part of the right secured by Article 10 (ibid.). In addition, the 
existence of procedural safeguards for the benefit of a defendant in defamation proceedings is 
among the factors to be taken into account in assessing the proportionality of an interference 
under Article 10. In particular, it is important for the defendant to be afforded a realistic 
chance to prove that there was a sufficient factual basis for his allegations (see, among other 
authorities, Steel and Morris v. the United Kingdom, no. 68416/01, § 95, ECHR 2005-II; 
Andrushko v. Russia, no. 4260/04, § 53, 14 October 2010; Dilipak and Karakaya v. Turkey, 
nos. 7942/05 and 24838/05, § 141, 4 March 2012; and Hasan Yazıcı v. Turkey, no. 40877/07, 
§ 54, 15 April 2014). No such chance was afforded in the present case. 
 
156. The Court takes the view that, in the circumstances of the case, the impugned statements 
were more value judgments than pure statements of fact, in view of the general tone of the 
remarks and the context in which they were made, as they reflected mainly an overall 
assessment of the conduct of the investigating judges in the course of the investigation. 
 
157. It thus remains to be examined whether the “factual basis” for those value judgments was 
sufficient. 
 
158. The Court is of the opinion that this condition was fulfilled in the present case. After the 
case had been withdrawn from Judges M. and L.L. by the Indictments Division of the Paris 
Court of Appeal (see paragraph 23 above), it became apparent that an important item of 
evidence in the file, namely a video-cassette recorded during a visit by the judges, 
accompanied by experts, to the scene of the death, even though it had been referred to in the 
last decision given by those judges, had not been forwarded with the investigation file to the 
judge appointed to replace them. That fact was not only established but it was also sufficiently 
serious to justify the drafting by Judge P. of a report in which he recorded the following: first, 
the video-cassette did not appear in the investigation file and was not registered as an exhibit; 
and second, it had been given to him in an envelope, which showed no sign of having been 
placed under seal, bearing the name of Judge M. as addressee and also containing a 
handwritten card with the letter head of the public prosecutor of Djibouti, written by him and 
addressed to Judge M. (see paragraph 32 above). 
 
159. Moreover, in addition to the fact that the card showed a certain friendliness on the part of 
the public prosecutor of Djibouti towards Judge M. (see paragraph 32 above), it accused the 
civil parties’ lawyers of “orchestrating their manipulation”. The Court would emphasise in 
this connection that, not only have the Djibouti authorities supported the theory of suicide 
from the outset, but also a number of representatives of that State have been personally 
implicated in the context of the judicial investigation conducted in France, as can be seen in 
particular from the judgment of the International Court of Justice (see paragraphs 63-64 
above) and from the proceedings brought on a charge of procuring of false evidence (see 
paragraph 18 above). 
 
160. Lastly, it has been established that the applicant acted in his capacity as lawyer in two 
high-profile cases in which Judge M. was an investigating judge. In both of them the applicant 
succeeded in obtaining findings by the appellate courts that there had been shortcomings in 
the proceedings, leading to the withdrawal of the cases from Judge M. (see paragraphs 22-23 
and 26 above). In the context of the first case, known as the “Scientology” case, the applicant 
additionally secured a ruling that the French State was liable for the malfunctioning of the 
justice system (see paragraph 30 above). 
 
161. It further considers that the expressions used by the applicant had a sufficiently close 
connection with the facts of the case, in addition to the fact that his remarks could not be 
regarded as misleading or as a gratuitous attack (see paragraph 139 above). It reiterates in this 
connection that freedom of expression “is applicable not only to ‘information’ or ‘ideas’ that 
are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to 
those that offend, shock or disturb”. Similarly, the use of a “caustic tone” in comments aimed 
at a judge is not incompatible with the provisions of Article 10 of the Convention (see, for 
example, Gouveia Gomes Fernandes and Freitas e Costa, cited above, § 48). 
(d) The specific circumstances of the case 
(i) The need to take account of the overall background 
162. The Court reiterates that, in the context of Article 10 of the Convention, it must take 
account of the circumstances and overall background against which the statements in question 
were made (see, among many other authorities, Lingens, cited above, § 40, and Bladet 
Tromsø and Stensaas v. Norway [GC], no. 21980/93, § 62, ECHR 1999-III). In the present 
case, the background can be explained not only by the conduct of the investigating judges and 
by the applicant’s relations with one of them, but also by the very specific history of the case, 
its inter-State dimension and its substantial media coverage. The Court would observe, 
however, that the Court of Appeal attributed an extensive scope to the impugned remark of 
the applicant criticising an investigating judge for “conduct which [was] completely at odds 
with the principles of impartiality and fairness”, finding that this was in itself a particularly 
defamatory accusation, tantamount to saying that there had been a breach of professional 
ethics and of the judicial oath on the part of that judge (see paragraph 47 above). That 
quotation should, however, have been assessed in the light of the specific circumstances of the 
case, especially as it was in reality not a statement made to the author of the article, but an 
extract from the letter sent by the applicant and his colleague Mr L. de Caunes to the Minister 
of Justice on 6 September 2000. In addition, at the time when the applicant answered his 
questions the journalist had already been informed of the letter to the Minister of Justice, not 
by the applicant himself, but by his own sources, as the Criminal Court acknowledged (see 
paragraph 40 above). The applicant further argued, without this being in dispute, that the 
article’s author was solely responsible for the reference to the disciplinary proceedings against 
Judge M. in the context of the “Scientology” case. In that connection, the Court reiterates that 
lawyers cannot be held responsible for everything appearing in an “interview” published by 
the press or for actions by the press. 
 
163. The Court of Appeal was thus required to examine the impugned remarks with full 
consideration of both the background to the case and the content of the letter, taken as a 
whole. 
 
164. For the same reasons, since the impugned remarks could not be assessed out of context, 
the Court cannot share the view of the Paris Court of Appeal that the use of the term 
“connivance” constituted “in itself” a serious attack on the honour and reputation of Judge M. 
and the public prosecutor of Djibouti (see paragraph 47 above). 
 
165. As to the question of personal animosity on the part of the applicant towards Judge M., 
on account of conflicts in the context of the Borrel and “Scientology” cases, the Court takes 
the view that this aspect was insufficiently relevant and serious to warrant the applicant’s 
conviction. In any event, since the courts acknowledged the existence of conflicts between the 
two protagonists, and in view of the particular circumstances of the present case, such a 
reproach of personal animosity could have been made as much to Judge M. as to the applicant 
(see, mutatis mutandis, Paturel, cited above, § 45), especially as before filing a complaint 
against the applicant for complicity in defamation Judge M. had already unsuccessfully filed a 
complaint against him for false accusation (see paragraph 35 above). The Court of Appeal’s 
reliance on the applicant’s personal animosity is also at least undermined, if not contradicted, 
by other factors. Firstly, the remark concerning “conduct which [was] completely at odds with 
the principles of impartiality and fairness” was directed not only at Judge M., but also at 
Judge L.L., in respect of whom the applicant was not accused of showing any personal 
animosity. Furthermore, while the proceedings against the applicant concerned the above-
cited extract from the letter to the Minister of Justice, that letter had in reality been signed and 
sent by two lawyers, the applicant and his colleague Mr de Caunes. In the case of the latter, 
however, not only has he not been prosecuted for remarks that were attributable as much to 
him as to the applicant, he has not been accused of showing any animosity towards Judge M. 
or Judge L.L. 
 
166. In conclusion, the Court considers that the applicant’s statements could not be reduced to 
the mere expression of personal animosity, that is to say an antagonistic relationship between 
two individuals, the applicant and Judge M. The impugned remarks fell, in reality, within a 
broader context, also involving another lawyer and another judge. In the Court’s opinion, that 
fact is capable of supporting the idea that the remarks were not part of any personal action on 
the part of the applicant, out of a desire for vengeance, but rather formed part of a joint 
professional initiative by two lawyers, on account of facts that were new, established and 
capable of revealing serious shortcomings in the justice system, involving the two judges who 
had formerly been conducting the investigation in a case in which the two lawyers’ clients 
were civil parties. 
 
167. In addition, while the applicant’s remarks certainly had a negative connotation, it should 
be pointed out that, notwithstanding their somewhat hostile nature (see E.K. v. Turkey, no. 
28496/95, §§ 79-80, 7 February 2002) and seriousness (see Thoma, cited above), the key 
question in the statements concerned the functioning of a judicial investigation, which was a 
matter of public interest, thus leaving little room for restrictions on freedom of expression. In 
addition, a lawyer should be able to draw the public’s attention to potential shortcomings in 
the justice system; the judiciary may benefit from constructive criticism. 
(ii) Maintaining the authority of the judiciary 
168. The Government relied on the fact that the judicial authorities had no right of reply. It is 
true that the particular task of the judiciary in society requires judges to observe a duty of 
discretion (see paragraph 128 above). However, that duty pursues a specific aim, as noted by 
the third-party interveners: the speech of judges, unlike that of lawyers, is received as the 
expression of an objective assessment which commits not only the person expressing himself, 
but also, through him, the entire justice system. Lawyers, for their part, merely speak in their 
own name and on behalf of their clients, thus also distinguishing them from journalists, whose 
role in the judicial debate and purpose are intrinsically different. Nevertheless, while it may 
prove necessary to protect the judiciary against gravely damaging attacks that are essentially 
unfounded, bearing in mind that judges are prevented from reacting by their duty of discretion 
(see paragraph 128 above), this cannot have the effect of prohibiting individuals from 
expressing their views, through value judgments with a sufficient factual basis, on matters of 
public interest related to the functioning of the justice system, or of banning any criticism of 
the latter. In the present case, Judges M. and L.L. were members of the judiciary and were 
thus both part of a fundamental institution of the State: they were therefore subject to wider 
limits of acceptable criticism than ordinary citizens and the impugned comments could 
therefore be directed against them in that capacity (see paragraphs 128 and 131 above). 
 
169. The Court further finds, contrary to what has been argued by the Government, that the 
applicant’s remarks were not capable of undermining the proper conduct of the judicial 
proceedings, in view of the fact that the higher court had withdrawn the case from the two 
investigating judges concerned by the criticisms. Neither the new investigating judge nor the 
higher courts were targeted in any way by the impugned remarks. 
 
170. Nor can it be considered, for the same reasons, and taking account of the foregoing, that 
the applicant’s conviction could serve to maintain the authority of the judiciary. The Court 
would nevertheless emphasise the importance, in a State governed by the rule of law and in a 
democratic society, of maintaining the authority of the judiciary. In any event, the proper 
functioning of the courts would not be possible without relations based on consideration and 
mutual respect between the various protagonists in the justice system, at the forefront of 
which are judges and lawyers. 
(iii) The use of available remedies 
171. With regard to the Government’s argument as to the possibility of using available 
remedies, the Court finds it pertinent but not sufficient in the present case to justify the 
applicant’s conviction. It first notes that the use of available remedies, on the one hand, and 
the right to freedom of expression, on the other, do not pursue the same aim and are not 
interchangeable. That being said, the Court takes the view that the defence of a client by his 
lawyer must be conducted not in the media, save in very specific circumstances (see 
paragraph 138 above), but in the courts of competent jurisdiction, and this involves using any 
available remedies. It notes that in the present case the referral to the Indictments Division of 
the Paris Court of Appeal patently showed that the initial intention of the applicant and his 
colleague was to resolve the matter using the available remedies. It was, in reality, only after 
that remedy had been used that the problem complained of occurred, as recorded by the 
investigating judge P. in his official report of 1 August 2000 (see paragraph 32 above). At that 
stage the Indictments Division was no longer in a position to examine such complaints, 
precisely because it had withdrawn the case from Judges M. and L.L. The Court further notes 
that, in any event, four and a half years had already elapsed since the opening of the judicial 
investigation, which has still not been closed to date. It also observes that the civil parties and 
their lawyers took an active part in the proceedings and, in particular, that they succeeded, 
according to the judgment of the Versailles Court of Appeal of 28 May 2009, in having a 
material witness examined in Belgium in spite of a lack of interest in him on the part of the 
investigating judges M. and L.L. (see paragraph 16 above). 
 
172. Moreover, the request for an investigation made to the Minister of Justice complaining 
about these new facts was not a judicial remedy – such as to justify possibly refraining from 
intervention in the press – but a mere request for an administrative investigation subject to the 
discretionary decision of the Minister of Justice. The Court notes in this connection that the 
domestic judges themselves, both at first instance and on appeal, took the view that the letter 
could not enjoy the immunity afforded to judicial acts, the Criminal Court having found that 
its content was purely informative (see paragraphs 38 and 46 above). The Court observes that 
it has not been argued that this request was acted upon and, in addition, it notes that Judges M. 
and L.L. clearly did not see it as the normal use of a remedy available under domestic law, but 
as an act justifying the filing of a complaint for false accusation (see paragraph 35 above). 
 
173. Lastly, the Court finds that neither the Principal Public Prosecutor nor the relevant Bar 
Council or chairman of the Bar found it necessary to bring disciplinary proceedings against 
the applicant on account of his statements in the press, although such a possibility was open to 
them (see Mor, cited above, § 60). 
(iv) Conclusion as to the circumstances of the present case 
174. The Court is of the view that the impugned remarks by the applicant did not constitute 
gravely damaging and essentially unfounded attacks on the action of the courts, but criticisms 
levelled at Judges M. and L.L. as part of a debate on a matter of public interest concerning the 
functioning of the justice system, and in the context of a case which had received wide media 
coverage from the outset. While those remarks could admittedly be regarded as harsh, they 
nevertheless constituted value judgments with a sufficient “factual basis”. 
(e) The sanctions imposed 
175. As to the sentences imposed, the Court reiterates that, in assessing the proportionality of 
the interference, the nature and severity of the penalties imposed are also factors to be taken 
into account (see, for example, Sürek, cited above, § 64; Chauvy and Others v. France, no. 
64915/01, § 78, ECHR 2004-VI; and Mor, cited above, § 61). In the present case, the Court of 
Appeal sentenced the applicant to pay a fine of EUR 4,000. This amount corresponds 
precisely to that fixed by the first-instance court, where the judges had expressly taken into 
account the applicant’s status as a lawyer to justify their severity and to impose on him “a fine 
of a sufficiently high amount” (see paragraph 41 above). In addition to ordering the insertion 
of a notice in the newspaper Le Monde, the court ordered him to pay, jointly with the 
journalist and the publication director, EUR 7,500 in damages to each of the two judges, 
together with EUR 4,000 to Judge L.L. in costs. The Court notes, moreover, that the applicant 
alone was ordered to pay a sum to Judge M. in respect of costs, amounting to EUR 1,000. 
 
176. The Court reiterates that even when the sanction is the lightest possible, such as a guilty 
verdict with a discharge in respect of the criminal sentence and an award of only a “token 
euro” in damages (see Mor, cited above, § 61), it nevertheless constitutes a criminal sanction 
and, in any event, that fact cannot suffice, in itself, to justify the interference with the 
applicant’s freedom of expression (see Brasilier, cited above, § 43). The Court has 
emphasised on many occasions that interference with freedom of expression may have a 
chilling effect on the exercise of that freedom (see, mutatis mutandis, Cumpănă and Mazăre 
v. Romania [GC], no. 33348/96, § 114, ECHR 2004-XI, and Mor, cited above) – a risk that 
the relatively moderate nature of a fine would not suffice to negate (see Dupuis and Others, 
cited above, § 48). It should also be noted that imposing a sanction on a lawyer may have 
repercussions that are direct (disciplinary proceedings) or indirect (in terms, for example, of 
their image or the confidence placed in them by the public and their clients). The Court 
would, moreover, reiterate that the dominant position of the State institutions requires the 
authorities to show restraint in resorting to criminal proceedings (see paragraph 127 above). 
The Court observes, however, that in the present case the applicant’s punishment was not 
confined to a criminal conviction: the sanction imposed on him was not the “lightest 
possible”, but was, on the contrary, of some significance, and his status as a lawyer was even 
relied upon to justify greater severity. 
3. Conclusion 
177. In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that the judgment against the applicant for 
complicity in defamation can be regarded as a disproportionate interference with his right to 
freedom of expression, and was not therefore “necessary in a democratic society” within the 
meaning of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
178. Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION 
179. Article 41 of the Convention provides: 
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal 
law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if 
necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.” 
A. Damage 
180. The applicant claimed 4,270 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage, corresponding 
to the amounts he was ordered to pay on account of the judgment against him, and EUR 
20,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage on account of the violation of Articles 6 and 10 of 
the Convention. 
 
181. The Government did not comment on those claims before the Grand Chamber. 
 
182. The Court observes that the applicant was ordered to pay a fine of EUR 4,000, together 
with the sum of EUR 1,000 in respect of Judge M.’s costs and expenses, in addition to an 
award of EUR 7,500 in damages to each of the judges to be paid jointly with the other two co-
defendants, and EUR 4,000 in respect of Judge L.L.’s costs (see paragraph 46 above). It thus 
takes the view that there is a sufficient causal link between the alleged pecuniary damage and 
the violation found under Article 6 and, especially, under Article 10 of the Convention. It is 
thus appropriate to order, under the head of pecuniary damage, the reimbursement of the sums 
that the applicant was required to pay, within the limit indicated in his claim, namely EUR 
4,270, which corresponds to the amount of the fine, plus taxes and court courts, that was paid 
to the Treasury. 
 
183. The Court further finds that the applicant clearly sustained non-pecuniary damage on 
account of his criminal conviction and, ruling on an equitable basis, it awards him EUR 
15,000 on that basis. 
B. Costs and expenses 
184. The applicant claimed EUR 26,718.80 in respect of costs and expenses for the 
proceedings before the Court. 
 
185. The Government made no comment on this claim before the Grand Chamber. 
 
186. The Court reiterates that costs and expenses will not be awarded under Article 41 unless 
it is established that they were actually incurred, were necessarily incurred and were also 
reasonable as to quantum (see, among many other authorities, Iatridis v. Greece [GC] (just 
satisfaction), no. 31107/96, § 54, ECHR 2000-XI; Beyeler v. Italy (just satisfaction) [GC], no. 
33202/96, § 27, 28 May 2002; and Kurić and Others v. Slovenia (just satisfaction) [GC], no. 
26828/06, ECHR 2014). 
 
187. In the present case, taking account of the documents in its possession and the above-
mentioned criteria, the Grand Chamber finds it reasonable to award EUR 14,400 on that basis 
to the applicant. 
C. Default interest 
188. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the 
marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three 
percentage points.  
 
(…) 
 
 
 
Advocaten in de media. Het EHRM op de bres voor het recht op expressievrijheid van 
advocaten. 
 
Het uiten van felle kritiek in de media op (individuele) rechters is een heikel thema in de 
relatie tussen media en justitie. Het ligt nog gevoeliger als die kritiek komt van advocaten, in 
verband met een rechtszaak waarin ze zelf betrokken zijn. Vooral in strafzaken komen 
advocaten zelf in de picture, soms met felle aanklachten tegen de onderzoeksrechters of 
magistraten die het onderzoek of de terechtzittingen leiden. Vanuit justitie en de advocatuur 
wordt hierop vaak negatief of zelfs misprijzend gereageerd. Onlangs nog beklemtoonde oud-
stafhouder en voormalig OVB-voorzitter Jo Stevens dat het proces “uiteraard in de rechtbank 
moet gevoerd worden en niet in de media”2. Een forumbijdrage van Hugo Lamon kreeg in 
een recent nummer in De Juristenkrant de titel mee: “Waarom advocaten soms beter 
zwijgen”3 en ook de huidige voorzitter van de Orde van Vlaamse Balies liet onlangs in een 
opiniestuk in De Morgen zijn ongenoegen blijken omtrent de wijze waarop sommige 
advocaten al te forse stellingen verkondigen en interviews geven in de media4. 
 
Met een arrest van 23 april 2015 heeft de Grote Kamer van het Europees Mensenrechtenhof 
de expressievrijheid van advocaten via de media nochtans duidelijk opgetild: hoewel de rol 
van advocaten niet dezelfde is als die van journalisten, erkent het Hof dat ook advocaten het 
recht hebben om openlijk flinke kritiek te uiten op justitie, als onderdeel van het 
maatschappelijk debat. In de zaak Morice t. Frankrijk erkent het Hof het recht van advocaten 
                                                          
2
 R. BOONE, “Stafhouders hebben aan soortgelijk gewicht ingeboet bij gerechtelijke hervorming”, De 
Juristenkrant 2015/311 (interview met Jo Stevens, naar aanleiding van nieuwe editie van J. STEVENS, 
Advocatuur. Regels & Deontologie, Wolters Kluwer, 2015, 1102 p.). In de nieuwe editie van zijn boek schrijft 
Stevens (p. 579) : “Advocaten worden in tv-journaals vaak gebruikt als plaatje bij een nieuwsitem; zoals 
brandweermannen bij een brand en ziekenwagens bij een ongeluk. Zonder inhoudelijke meerwaarde voor de 
cliënt, maar met een voor hun kleinburgerlijk publicitair genoegen “op TV geweest te zijn”. Hun mediatieke 
tussenkomsten zijn vaak van een ontluisterende onbenulligheid, indien al niet ronduit juridisch fout”.  
3
 H. LAMON, “Waarom advocaten soms beter zwijgen”, De Juristenkrant 2015/310, 13. Deze bijdrage van 
Lamon was een reactie op L. NEELS, “Het woord te voeren past de advocaat. Toch?”, De Juristenkrant 
2015/309, 11. 
4
 D. MATTHYS, “Waar halen sommige advocaten het” en R. WOUTERS, “Orde van Vlaamse Balies fluit 
media-advocaten. ‘Rechtspraak is geen spektakel’”, De Morgen 12 augustus 2015, 1-2. 
om gegronde twijfels over de integriteit en onpartijdigheid van (onderzoeks)rechters in een 
concrete zaak (ook) via de media onder de aandacht te brengen. De strafrechtelijke 
veroordeling van Morice wegens laster en eerroof beoordeelt het EHRM strijdig met artikel 
10 EVRM dat het recht op expressievrijheid waarborgt5. 
 
Het arrest van de Grote Kamer zal ongetwijfeld bij justitie en binnen de advocatuur voorwerp 
zijn van grondige analyse en discussie. Hoewel het arrest duidelijk maakt dat advocaten in dit 
soort zaken maar moeilijk het zwijgen kunnen worden opgelegd via strafrechtelijke weg, laat 
de Grote Kamer van het EHRM nog wel voldoende opening om bepaalde beperkingen op te 
leggen aan media-optredens door advocaten. Pertinente en proportionele vormen van 
inmenging of beperkingen inzake media-optredens door advocaten blijven mogelijk, maar dan 
eerder in toepassing van concrete deontologische voorschriften. Het Hof maakt duidelijk dat 
correctionele vervolging van en strafsancties voor advocaten maar moeilijk kunnen 
verantwoord worden in een democratische samenleving. Uit het arrest volgt ook dat een 
algemeen verbod van commentaar en kritiek door advocaten in de media, de toets aan artikel 
10 EVRM niet kan doorstaan. 
 
Situering 
 
In 2000 werkte de Franse advocaat Olivier Morice mee aan een artikel in de krant Le Monde. 
Daarin werd gerapporteerd  over de controverses in een gerechtelijk onderzoek naar het 
verdacht overlijden (zelfdoding of moord?) van een Franse rechter in Djibouti (Bernard 
Borrel). Er  was sprake van manipulaties door de twee onderzoeksrechters die het gerechtelijk 
onderzoek hadden geleid. De journalist die het artikel schreef, de directeur van Le Monde en 
Morice werden veroordeeld voor laster en eerroof, in toepassing van de Franse perswet van 
1881. Het Hof van Cassatie bevestigde de veroordelingen. De Franse rechtscolleges waren 
van oordeel dat het om zeer ernstige beschuldigingen ging waarvoor geen voldoende feitelijk 
bewijs geleverd kon worden. Morice kon zich evenmin beroepen op de immuniteit als 
advocaat, omdat de lasterlijke uitingen niet waren uitgesproken tijdens een terechtzitting. 
 
Het EHRM werd gevraagd om de veroordeling van Morice tegen het licht te houden van 
artikel 10 EVRM (recht op vrijheid van meningsuiting). Het Hof was van oordeel dat Morice 
“a adopté un comportement dépassant les limites que les avocats doivent respecter dans la 
critique publique de la justice”. De geldboete van 4.000 euro en de aanvullende 
schadevergoeding van 7.500 euro die Morice moest betalen, achtte het Hof, gelet op de 
appreciatiemarge van de veroordelende staat, niet excessief. De vijfde sectie van het Hof 
kwam in een arrest van 11 juli 2013 tot de conclusie dat van schending van artikel 10 EVRM 
geen sprake was. Dit  arrest  werd evenwel niet definitief, want op 9 december 2013 verwees 
het panel van vijf rechters, op verzoek van Morice, de zaak naar de Grote Kamer van Hof, in 
toepassing van artikel 43 EVRM. 
 
Op 23 april 2015 kwam de Grote Kamer, unaniem, tot een heel andere conclusie. De Grote 
Kamer concludeert dat de veroordeling van Morice neerkomt op een overheidsinmenging in 
de expressievrijheid die niet nodig is in een democratische samenleving en daarom een 
inbreuk is op artikel 10 EVRM. 
 
                                                          
5
 Voor een situering, zie D. VOORHOOF, “ Vrijheid van meningsuiting en drukpersvrijheid”, in J. VANDE 
LANOTTE, G. GOEDERTIER, Y. HAECK, J. GOOSSENS en T. DE PELSEMAEKER, Belgisch Publiek 
Recht, Deel I, Brugge, Die Keure, 2015, 577-613. 
Dat journalisten soms flink mogen uithalen naar rechters heeft het Hof eerder al aanvaard, 
onder andere in de zaak De Haes en Gijsels t. België6. De 17 rechters van de Grote Kamer van 
het EHRM, die zelf ook regelmatig een flinke portie kritiek in de media en rechtsleer te 
verwerken krijgen, hebben nu duidelijk gemaakt dat ook hun collega-rechters in de 47 
lidstaten van het EVRM bestand moeten zijn tegen soms ernstige aantijgingen in de media7, 
ook wanneer die geuit worden door advocaten8. 
 
Basisvoorwaarde is wel dat die kritiek verband houdt met een zaak van maatschappelijk 
belang en de aantijgingen of kritiek een voldoende feitelijke basis hebben. De Grote Kamer 
gaat met dit arrest diametraal in tegen de bevindingen van het kamerarrest van de vijfde 
sectie, dat duidelijk meer de klemtoon legde op het bewaren van het vertrouwen van het 
publiek in justitie, de te felle persoonlijke uitval door Morice tegen de twee 
onderzoeksrechters en het speculatief karakter van de zeer ernstige aantijgingen. 
 
Met het arrest van 23 april 2015 kiest het EHRM duidelijk voor een ruimer draagvlak voor de 
expressievrijheid van advocaten, met oog voor hun professionele rol in de samenleving en het 
belang van hun stem in het publieke debat, zeker over aangelegenheden die verband houden 
met justitie(beleid) en belangrijke rechtszaken. Ook al worden dan soms, onvermijdelijk, 
individuele rechters in het vizier genomen. 
 
Het arrest 
 
Het Hof neemt andermaal een aanloop met verwijzing naar de basisprincipes uit eerdere 
rechtspraak betreffende expressievrijheid van advocaten.  In algemene termen laat het Hof 
noteren dat het uitgangspunt is en blijft dat ook advocaten kritiek moeten kunnen uiten op 
leden van rechterlijke macht . Daarom moeten de overheden er zich zoveel mogelijk van 
onthouden om via strafvervolging beperkingen op de leggen aan het recht op 
expressievrijheid van advocaten: 
 
“Generally speaking, while it is legitimate for the institutions of the State, as guarantors of 
the institutional public order, to be protected by the competent authorities, the dominant 
position occupied by those institutions requires the authorities to display restraint in resorting 
to criminal proceedings” (§ 127). 
 
                                                          
6
 EHRM 24 februari 1997, De Haes en Gijsels t. België; D. VOORHOOF, “De grenzen aan de kritiek op (leden 
van) de rechterlijke macht. Enkele beschouwingen bij de vonnissen inzake de magistraten W., X., Y. en Z. tegen 
De Morgen en Humo”, Recht en Kritiek, 1989/3, 280-304; D. VOORHOOF, “Media en gerechtsverslaggeving. 
De bescherming van de eer en goede naam van magistraten en het waarborgen van het gezag en de 
onpartijdigheid van de rechterlijke macht als beperking op de vrijheid van expressie en informatie”, Panopticon, 
1989/3, 217-237; D. VOORHOOF, “België veroordeeld wegens inbreuk op artikel 10 van het EVRM. Situering 
EHRM 24 februari 1997”, Auteurs & Media 1997/2, 196-197 en D. VOORHOOF, “Het Humo-arrest, scherpe 
kritiek op rechters geoorloofd”, Mediaforum 1997/4, 68-69. Zie ook D. VOORHOOF, “Criticising Judges in  
Belgium”, in M. ADDO (ed.), Freedom of Expression and the Criticism of Judges. A comparative study of 
European legal standards, Aldershot, Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2000, 89-111. 
7
 Zie eerder ook de arresten van het EHRM in Amihalachioaie t. Moldavië, Kyprianou t. Cyprus (Grote Kamer); 
Foglia t. Zwitserland; Kabanov t. Rusland; Gouveia Gomes Fernandes en Freitas e Costa t. Portugal; Mor t. 
Frankrijk; Ümit Bilgiç t. Turkije en Mustafa Erdoğan t. Turkije. Vgl. Barfod t. Denmarken, Prager en 
Oberschlick t. Oostenrijk; Schöpfer t. Zwitserland; Hrico t. Slovakije; Perna t. Italië (Grote Kamer); Cumpănă 
en Mazăre t. Roemenië (Grote Kamer) en Karpetas t. Griekenland. 
8
 Voor een overzicht van de EHRM-rechtspraak betreffende het recht op expressievrijheid van advocaten, zie I. 
HØEDT-RASMUSSEN, Developing Identity for Lawyers – Towards Sustainable Lawyering, CBS, Copenhagen 
2014, 80-91, http://openarchive.cbs.dk/handle/10398/8908. 
Limieten tegen ongefundeerde uitvallen tegen rechters zijn er zeker wel:  
 
“Questions concerning the functioning of the justice system, an institution that is essential for 
any democratic society, fall within the public interest. In this connection, regard must be had 
to the special role of the judiciary in society. As the guarantor of justice, a fundamental value 
in a law-governed State, it must enjoy public confidence if it is to be successful in carrying out 
its duties. It may therefore prove necessary to protect such confidence against gravely 
damaging attacks that are essentially unfounded, especially in view of the fact that judges 
who have been criticised are subject to a duty of discretion that precludes them from 
replying” (§ 128). 
 
Die beperkingen mogen evenwel niet van aard zijn het basisrecht op expressievrijheid in de 
praktijk te ondergraven. Ook rechters maken immers zelf deel uit van de staatsinstellingen die 
voorwerp van kritiek moeten kunnen zijn:  
 
“Nevertheless – save in the case of gravely damaging attacks that are essentially unfounded – 
bearing in mind that judges form part of a fundamental institution of the State, they may as 
such be subject to personal criticism within the permissible limits, and not only in a 
theoretical and general manner” (§§ 130-131). 
 
Het Hof verduidelijkt dat de limieten van kritiek op magistraten, geuit door advocaten in de 
media, vertolkt zijn in een reeks deontologische voorschriften: 
 
“Consequently, freedom of expression is applicable also to lawyers. It encompasses not only 
the substance of the ideas and information expressed but also the form in which they are 
conveyed (..). Lawyers are thus entitled, in particular, to comment in public on the 
administration of justice, provided that their criticism does not overstep certain bounds (..). 
Those bounds lie in the usual restrictions on the conduct of members of the Bar (..), as 
reflected in the ten basic principles enumerated by the CCBE for European lawyers, with 
their particular reference to “dignity”, “honour” and “integrity” and to “respect for ... the 
fair administration of justice”9 (§ 134). 
 
Om alle aspecten van de zaak te kunnen overzien beoordeelt het Hof vervolgens de zaak 
vanuit vijf verschillende criteria. Het analyseert (a) de rol van Morice als advocaat, (b) de 
bijdrage van zijn interview in Le Monde aan een debat van publiek belang, (c) de aard van de 
aantijgingen en commentaar in het gewraakte artikel, (d) de overige specifieke kenmerken van 
de zaak en (e) de aard en impact van de opgelegde sancties. 
 
Het Hof wijst er op dat een onderscheid gemaakt moet worden tussen kritiek in de rechtszaal 
en kritiek op rechters via de media. Scherpe kritiek op rechters in de rechtszaal is acceptabel, 
zeker als zo’n tussenkomst van de advocaat de rechten van de cliënt beoogt te vrijwaren. In de 
zaak Morice gaat het evenwel om een heel andere context, buiten de rechtszaal en zijn 
commentaar in Le Monde draagt niet bij tot de bescherming van de belangen van zijn cliënt. 
Het Hof gaat ook niet akkoord met de stelling als zou een advocaat, net zoals een journalist, 
de taak hebben om het publiek te informeren over het reilen en zeilen bij justitie. Door zijn 
relatie met zowel justitie als met zijn cliënt heeft de advocaat een heel andere rol en positie: 
 
                                                          
9
 In § 58 van het arrest verwijst het Hof naar de CCBE Code of Conduct en het CCBE-Charter, beide opgesteld 
door de Council of Bars and Law Societies. 
“Journalists have the task of imparting, in conformity with their duties and responsibilities, 
information and ideas on all matters of public interest, including those relating to the 
administration of justice. Lawyers, for their part, are protagonists in the justice system, 
directly involved in its functioning and in the defence of a party. They cannot therefore be 
equated with an external witnesses whose task it is to inform the public” (§ 148). 
 
Dat Morice met zijn commentaar in Le Monde heeft bijgedragen tot een fel debat in een zeer 
belangrijke rechtszaak staat voor de Grote Kamer evenwel buiten kijf. Dat heeft tot gevolg dat 
het EHRM geen te brede appreciatiemarge moet laten aan de nationale rechtscolleges bij de 
beoordeling van de feiten en het Hof dus tot een strikte monitoring kan overgaan om te 
oordelen of de inmenging in de expressievrijheid gerechtvaardigd was. Cruciaal is de 
vaststelling door het Hof dat de opmerkingen van Morice eerder als waardeoordelen te 
beschouwen zijn en neerkomen op een algemene kritiek op het optreden door de twee 
onderzoeksrechters.  
 
Het Hof verwerpt de vaststellingen door de Franse rechtscolleges als zouden de commentaren 
van Morice een onvoldoende feitelijke basis hebben en een onbetamelijke aanval zijn op de 
eer en integriteit van de twee rechters. Overigens kan een advocaat niet aansprakelijk worden 
gesteld voor bepaalde beweringen of stellingnames van de journalist die het artikel schreef. 
 
Het Hof vindt ook niet dat de verklaringen van Morice louter ingegeven waren door een 
persoonlijke vete met één van de twee onderzoeksrechters. Het doel van Morice was om 
ernstige gebreken bij justitie in deze zaak bloot te leggen en zijn publieke verklaringen waren 
niet van aard het vertrouwen of het gezag van justitie aan te tasten.  
 
Het Hof wijst er wel op dat een advocaat zijn gelijk moet proberen halen via procedures en 
rechtsmiddelen, en zijn proces niet in de media moet voeren. Expliciet erkent het Hof dat er 
wel heel specifieke omstandigheden kunnen zijn die de advocaat het recht geven zich via de 
media te uiten. Het beklemtoont dat een advocaat de aandacht van het publiek moet kunnen 
vestigen op eventuele disfuncties bij justitie, constructieve kritiek waarmee justitie dan haar 
voordeel kan doen: 
 
“The key question in the statements concerned the functioning of a judicial investigation, 
which was a matter of public interest, thus leaving little room for restrictions on freedom of 
expression. In addition, a lawyer should be able to draw the public’s attention to potential 
shortcomings in the justice system; the judiciary may benefit from constructive criticism” (§ 
167). 
 
Het waarborgen van het gezag van de rechterlijke macht kan evenwel geen argument zijn om 
de expressievrijheid van advocaten te verregaand in te perken. Daardoor is er dus ruimte voor 
commentaar en kritiek door advocaten op het functioneren van justitie, al moet dit wel zelf 
blijk geven van het nodige respect voor het justitiesysteem waarin rechters en advocaten een 
cruciale rol spelen: 
 
“In any event, the proper functioning of the courts would not be possible without relations 
based on consideration and mutual respect between the various protagonists in the justice 
system, at the forefront of which are judges and lawyers” (§ 170). 
 
Het Hof laat noteren dat de kritiek die Morice formuleerde in Le Monde aan de voorwaarde 
van “mutual respect” tegemoet komt, voldoende gefundeerd is en zich duidelijk situeerde in 
een ruimer publiek debat over het functioneren van justitie in een heel belangrijke zaak: 
 
“The Court is of the view that the impugned remarks by the applicant did not constitute 
gravely damaging and essentially unfounded attacks on the action of the courts, but criticisms 
levelled at Judges M. and L.L. as part of a debate on a matter of public interest concerning 
the functioning of the justice system, and in the context of a case which had received wide 
media coverage from the outset. While those remarks could admittedly be regarded as harsh, 
they nevertheless constituted value judgments with a sufficient “factual basis”” (§ 174). 
 
De strafrechtelijke veroordeling van Morice en de schadevergoeding die hem werd opgelegd 
acht de Grote Kamer een onbetamelijke inmenging in de expressievrijheid van de advocaat, 
met een verkillend effect : 
 
“The Court reiterates that even when the sanction is the lightest possible, such as a guilty 
verdict with a discharge in respect of the criminal sentence and an award of only a “token 
euro” in damages (..), it nevertheless constitutes a criminal sanction and, in any event, that 
fact cannot suffice, in itself, to justify the interference with the applicant’s freedom of 
expression (..). The Court has emphasised on many occasions that interference with freedom 
of expression may have a chilling effect on the exercise of that freedom (..) - a risk that the 
relatively moderate nature of a fine would not suffice to negate (..).  It should also be noted 
that imposing a sanction on a lawyer may have repercussions that are direct (disciplinary 
proceedings) or indirect (in terms, for example, of their image or the confidence placed in 
them by the public and their clients). The Court would, moreover, reiterate that the dominant 
position of the State institutions requires the authorities to show restraint in resorting to 
criminal proceedings (..). The Court observes, however, that in the present case the 
applicant’s punishment was not confined to a criminal conviction: the sanction imposed on 
him was not the “lightest possible”, but was, on the contrary, of some significance, and his 
status as a lawyer was even relied upon to justify greater severity” (§ 176). 
 
Het Hof concludeert dat de veroordeling van Morice neerkomt op een ontoelaatbare 
overheidsinmenging die niet nodig is in een democratische samenleving en daarom in strijd is 
met artikel 10 EVRM. 
 
Het EHRM-arrest en de OVB-codex in verband met advocaat en media 
 
De Grote Kamer van het Hof laat er geen twijfel over bestaan dat in het algemeen aan 
advocaten niet het recht kan ontzegd worden om commentaar te geven in de media over 
rechtszaken waarin ze zelf als raadsman betrokken zijn. Met verwijzing naar eerdere 
rechtspraak (Mor t. Frankrijk, § 59) brengt het Hof in herinnering: 
 
“that the defence of a client may be pursued by means of an appearance on the television 
news or a statement in the press, and through such channels the lawyer may inform the public 
about shortcomings that are likely to undermine pre-trial proceedings” (§ 138). 
 
In Morice t. Frankrijk gaat het Hof nog een stap verder. Het erkent dat zelfs wanneer de 
commentaar niet de concrete rechtsbelangen van de cliënt op het oog heeft, maar een 
thematiek betreft van algemeen belang, ook dan de advocaat, onder bepaalde voorwaarden 
(zie CCBE-code, cfr. supra), scherpe kritiek mag uiten, zelfs op een manier die een aantasting 
kan inhouden van de eer en goede naam van de behandelende magistraten in een concrete 
zaak. Het Grote Kamer-arrest benadrukt ook dat  
 “while it may prove necessary to protect the judiciary against gravely damaging attacks that 
are essentially unfounded, bearing in mind that judges are prevented from reacting by their 
duty of discretion (..), this cannot have the effect of prohibiting individuals from expressing 
their views, through value judgments with a sufficient factual basis, on matters of public 
interest related to the functioning of the justice system, or of banning any criticism of the 
latter” (§ 168). 
 
Hoewel het arrest in de zaak Morice t. Frankrijk de strafrechtelijke veroordeling betreft van 
een advocaat wegens lasterlijke uitingen in de media, in Frankrijk, heeft het arrest ook 
repercussies voor de relatie tussen media, advocaten en justitie in België, en meer bepaald in 
Vlaanderen. De Codex Deontologie voor Advocaten van de OVB (Orde van Vlaamse 
Balies)10 bevat immers een bepaling die best grondig tegen het licht van dit Grote Kamer-
arrest wordt gehouden. Meer bepaald stipuleert de OVB-codex over advocaat en media in 
Afdeling III.5.2. (Media),11 in artikel 3.1. het volgende: 
 
“De advocaat voert het proces niet in de media en onthoudt zich van alle commentaren, 
behalve indien, als gevolg van mededelingen in de media van het openbaar ministerie, de 
persrechter of derden in de media, de wapengelijkheid een reactie noodzakelijk maakt”. 
 
De tuchtrechtelijk gesanctioneerde verplichting voor de advocaat om zich “van alle 
commentaren” in de media te onthouden is in strijd met de basisprincipes die het EHRM 
vooropstelt in toepassing van artikel 10 EVRM. Dat er enkel een recht op commentaar voor 
de advocaat is als reactie op eerdere mededelingen via de media door het openbaar ministerie, 
een persrechter of derden teneinde de wapengelijkheid (in de media?) te waarborgen, is een te 
verregaande vernauwing en uitholling van het aan de advocaat gewaarborgde recht op 
expressievrijheid in toepassing van artikel 10 EVRM12. Uit niets blijkt immers dat dit recht 
pas in subsidiaire orde zou gelden, nl. enkel als reactie op eerdere mededelingen in de media 
die het recht op eerlijk proces van de cliënt bedreigen. Het arrest in de zaak Morice t. 
Frankrijk maakt duidelijk dat er ook daarbuiten omstandigheden kunnen zijn die het 
spreekrecht van de advocaten in toepassing van artikel 10 EVRM waarborgen.  
 
Dat de advocaat er zich in principe moet van onthouden het proces in de media te voeren, is 
overigens ook een overweging van het EHRM: “the Court takes the view that the defence of a 
client by his lawyer must be conducted not in the media, save in very specific circumstances” 
(§ 171). Het Hof laat evenwel expliciet een opening (“in very specific circumstances”), terwijl 
de formulering van artikel 3.1. in de OVB-codex een absolute strekking heeft en commentaar 
in de media vanwege een advocaat reduceert tot een reactiemogelijkheid naar aanleiding van 
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 De Codex integreert het OVB-Reglement over advocaat en media van 18 december 2013, B.S. 16 januari 
2014: OVB, Codex Deontologie voor Advocaten, B.S. 30 september 2014. Merk op dat ook (milde) tuchtsancties 
opgelegd door de tuchtoverheden binnen de advocatuur, als een ongeoorloofde inmenging in de 
expressievrijheid van de advocaat, een schending van artikel 10 (of 11) EVRM kunnen opleveren: zie Ezelin t. 
Frankrijk, Steur t. Nederland, Veraart t. Nederland en Kabanov t. Rusland. Zie ook D. VOORHOOF, De 
vrijheid van meningsuiting van de advocaat. Noot onder Cass. 4 juni 1987, T.G.R. (Tijdschrift voor Gentse 
Rechtspraak) 1987/3, 65-67. 
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 Zie ook J. STEVENS, Advocatuur. Regels & Deontologie, Wolters Kluwer, 2015, 573-579. 
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 Zie ook art. 28 quinquies, § 4 en art. 57 § 4 Sv. dat de advocaat het recht heeft om het onderzoeksgeheim 
ondergeschikt te maken aan de persvoorlichting in het openbaar belang: de advocaat kan “indien het belang van 
zijn cliënt het vereist” aan de media gegevens verstrekken in verband met een opsporingsonderzoek of een 
gerechtelijk onderzoek waarin zijn cliënt betrokken is. De advocaat moet hierbij waken over het vermoeden van 
onschuld, de rechten van de verdediging van de verdachte, het slachtoffer en derden, het privéleven en de 
waardigheid van personen en hoe dan ook “de regels van het beroep” respecteren. 
mediaverklaringen door OM, persrechters of derden, en daardoor in zijn toepassing in strijd 
komt met artikel 10 EVRM. Het artikel 3.1. van de OVB-codex lijkt overigens ook in te gaan 
tegen het in artikel 1.1. geponeerde algemene beginsel dat de advocaat “in alle 
omstandigheden (..) in de media, publiek gebruik (mag) maken van zijn titel en van zijn recht 
op vrije meningsuiting”. Ook artikel III.5.2.4 van de Codex dat  ongeclausuleerd bepaalt dat 
nadat de advocaat is opgevolgd, hij zich “van elke commentaar in de media” dient te 
onthouden, kan in bepaalde “very specific circumstances” op gespannen voet komen te staan 
met artikel 10 EVRM. Het is inderdaad “niet omdat hij behoort tot een gereglementeerd 
beroep met eigen tuchtorganen, dat licht mag worden omgesprongen met een fundamenteel 
recht als de vrijheid van meningsuiting van de advocaat” . Advocaten moeten juist door de 
functie die ze in de maatschappij vervullen “in de uitoefening van hun beroep genieten van 
een extra ruime vrijheid van meningsuiting binnen en buiten de rechtbank”13. 
 
Artikel III.5.2.2 en III.5.2.3 van de OVB-codex kunnen in het licht van het EHRM-arrest in de 
zaak Morice t. Frankrijk best niet te restrictief worden geïnterpreteerd. Artikel III.5.2.2. 
viseert de mogelijkheid tot het geven van commentaar in de media door de advocaat “over 
zaken waarin hijzelf niet betrokken was of is”, maar laat toch de mogelijkheid open om 
daarnaast via de media inlichtingen, toelichtingen en uiteenzettingen te verschaffen “over 
maatschappelijke evenementen en vraagstukken in het openbaar”, zonder dat daaraan de 
voorwaarde van niet-betrokkenheid is verbonden. Op basis van het arrest van 23 april 2015 
moet de (uitzonderlijke) mogelijkheid van commentaar in de media inderdaad mogelijk 
blijven, ook over een zaak waarin de advocaat zelf betrokken is14. Het is ook zoals Jo Stevens 
schrijft in de nieuwe editie van Advocatuur. Regels & Deontologie : hoe zouden advocaten er 
in slagen vertrouwen te wekken, “wanneer ze zelf niet van een minimale transparantie blijk 
zouden mogen geven”15. 
 
De eis, “zo mogelijk”, om vooraf de stafhouder te raadplegen, zijn standpunt in te winnen en 
zijn richtlijnen te volgen (art. 3.5 OVB-codex) kan eveneens strijd opleveren met artikel 10 
EVRM, aangezien een gerechtvaardigde commentaar door een advocaat in de media maar 
moeilijk preventief afhankelijk kan worden gemaakt van een consultatieplicht bij de 
stafhouder, laat staan dat het aan de stafhouder zou toekomen invulling te geven aan de 
inhoud van de commentaar van de advocaat in kwestie. Cruciaal blijft ook de overweging van 
het Hof in Morice t. Frankrijk: “(..) a lawyer should be able to draw the public’s attention to 
potential shortcomings in the justice system; the judiciary may benefit from constructive 
criticism”. Dit recht van de advocaat kan niet afhankelijk worden gemaakt van een 
voorafgaande melding aan de stafhouder of diens inhoudelijke directieven16. Een stafhouder 
kan ook geen “mediastilte”, of een “spreekverbod” opleggen17. 
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 Zie ook J. STEVENS, Advocatuur. Regels & Deontologie, o.c. 640 (nr. 890). 
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 De tuchtrechtspraak betreffende advocaten blijkt de lat hoger te leggen, namelijk door de advocaten enkel toe 
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Tuchtraad van Beroep voor Advocaten, Eerste Kamer, 10 December 2013, dossier nr. TB-0084-2013. 
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 J. STEVENS, Advocatuur. Regels & Deontologie, o.c., 640 (nr. 890). 
16
 In de beslissing van de Nederlandstalige Tuchtraad van Beroep voor Advocaten, Eerste Kamer, 10 December 
2013, dossier nr. TB-0084-2013, is de stelling bevestigd dat wanneer een incident ontstaat met een magistraat, de 
advocaat zich tot zijn Stafhouder dient te wenden. In toepassing van art. 429 Ger.W. heeft de eerbied die een 
advocaat aan het gerecht en de openbare overheid verschuldigd is, tot gevolg dat de advocaat “geen blijken van 
afkeuring van een magistraat of van diens beslissing kenbaar maakt”. De beslissing van de Tuchtraad van Beroep 
 Voor het overige valt overigens wel op dat de andere bepalingen van de OVB-codex inzake 
“Media”18 goed aansluiten bij een reeks principiële overwegingen en concrete richtlijnen die 
de Grote Kamer meegaf in het arrest van 23 april 2015, zoals de verwijzingen in artikel 
III.5.2.1. naar de principes van waardigheid, rechtschapenheid en kiesheid, de centrale rol van 
de advocaat in de rechtsbedeling (art. 1.2 en 1.3.), het respect voor loyaliteit (art. 1.5.), de 
plicht correcte informatie te verschaffen, op een serene manier (art. 1.6.), en het waken over 
de waardigheid en de regels van het beroep (art. 1.7). Ook benadrukt het OVB-reglement 
terecht dat de advocaat verantwoordelijk is voor zijn mededelingen in de media en in die 
context niet beschikt over de immuniteit van het pleidooi19 (art. 1.10). 
 
Het arrest van de Grote Kamer in de zaak Morice t. Frankrijk zal ongetwijfeld onder 
magistraten en binnen de advocatuur nog voorwerp zijn van grondige analyse en discussie. 
Hoewel het arrest van 23 april 2015 enkele duidelijke principes vooropzet, moet rekening 
worden gehouden met de heel specifieke context, de aard van de kritiek of de commentaar in 
de media, en de concrete omstandigheden waarin deze zaak zich situeerde. In andere 
omstandigheden, tegen de achtergrond van een andere feitelijke context zal de toepassing van 
artikel 10 EVRM minder verregaande garanties bieden voor de expressievrijheid van de 
advocaat bij het uiten van kritiek op leden van de magistratuur, zoals o.a. ook onlangs bleek in 
het arrest in de zaak Peruzzi t. Italië20. Het Hof vindt aansluiting bij de benadering in de zaak 
Morice voor wat één concrete aantijging betreft, maar is van oordeel dat een andere lasterlijke 
aantijging die publiek was geuit door een advocaat aan het adres van een magistraat niet ten 
volle aanspraak kan maken op de bescherming van artikel 10 EVRM. Het Hof concludeert, 
met een 5/2 stemverhouding:  
 
“ Eu égard à ce qui précède, la Cour estime que la condamnation du requérant pour les 
propos diffamatoires contenus dans sa lettre circulaire et la peine qui lui a été infligée, 
n’étaient pas disproportionnées aux buts légitimes visés et que les motifs avancés par les 
juridictions nationales étaient suffisants et pertinents pour justifier pareilles mesures. 
L’ingérence dans le droit du requérant à la liberté d’expression pouvait raisonnablement 
passer pour « nécessaire dans une société démocratique » afin de protéger la réputation 
d’autrui et pour garantir l’autorité et l’impartialité du pouvoir judiciaire au sens de l’article 
10 § 2. (..).  Il s’ensuit qu’il n’y a pas eu violation de cette disposition” (§§ 66-67). 
 
Opmerkelijk is dat het Hof in Peruzzi t. Italië de diverse criteria voor de grondige analyse in 
de zaak Morice t. Frankrijk niet herneemt, minder gewicht lijkt te geven aan het ernstig 
karakter van de zaak en de “potential shortcomings in the justice system” en voorts ook aan de 
strafrechtelijke veroordeling van de advocaat in kwestie minder negatieve consequenties 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
bevestigt ook de overweging van de Tuchtraad van de ordes van het rechtsgebied van het Hof van Beroep te 
Antwerpen van 27 juni 2013, volgens dewelke de advocaat “als actor van de rechtspleging (..) wel publiek kan 
verklaren dat hij het met een beslissing waarin hijzelf als advocaat betrokken was, oneens is maar (hij) dient in 
dat geval zijn concrete bezwaren te laten gelden via de daartoe geëigende (beroeps)procedures of andere kanalen 
en het juridisch debat niet in de openbaarheid te voeren” (Tuchtraad voor advocaten van de ordes van het 
rechtsgebied van het Hof van Beroep te Antwerpen van 27 juni 2013, TAA/SH/0139/2013). Merk op dat ook 
(milde) tuchtsancties opgelegd door de tuchtoverheden binnen de advocatuur, als een ongeoorloofde inmenging 
in de expressievrijheid van de advocaat, een schending van artikel 10 (of 11) EVRM kunnen opleveren: zie 
Ezelin t. Frankrijk, Steur t. Nederland, Veraart t. Nederland en Kabanov t. Rusland. 
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 J. STEVENS, Advocatuur. Regels & Deontologie, o.c., 579 (nr. 794). 
18Zie ook J. STEVENS, Advocatuur. Regels & Deontologie, o.c., 573-579. 
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 Zie ook art. 452 Sw. en art. 444-445 Ger. W. Zie hierover ook J. STEVENS, Advocatuur. Regels & 
Deontologie, o.c., 575 (nr. 789). 
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 EHRM 30 juni 2015, Peruzzi t. Italië.  
verbindt. Een eerste commentaar beoordeelde dit arrest als “a surprising and retrograde one 
in the light of the recent Grand Chamber decision in Morice v France”21. Opmerkelijk is ook 
de afsluitende overweging van de dissenting opinion bij het arrest Peruzzi t. Italië. De 
dissenting judges Wojtyczek en Grosev betwijfelen terecht of de strafvervolging en het 
opleggen van een forse schadevergoeding naar aanleiding van de geuitte kritiek door een 
advocaat op een rechter, daadwerkelijk een bijdrage kunnen leveren aan het vertrouwen van 
het publiek in justitie en het gezag van de rechterlijke macht: “La majorité justifie l’ingérence 
dans la liberté d’expression du requérant non seulement par le besoin de protéger la 
réputation d’une personne, mais aussi par la nécessité de garantir l’autorité de la justice. 
Dans cette optique, l’ingérence en considération devait contribuer à la protection de 
l’autorité de la justice en Italie. À notre avis, sur ce terrain, étant donné les spécificités de 
l’affaire exposées ci-dessus, l’ingérence dans la liberté d’expression du requérant risque de 
produire l’effet opposé à celui escompté ”. 
 
Het arrest van 30 juni 2015 in de zaak Peruzzi t. Italië is op het ogenblik van het afsluiten van 
de eindredactie van deze noot evenwel nog niet definitief. Het is nog even afwachten dus of 
een mogelijke verwijzing naar de Grote Kamer, zoals in Morice t. Frankrijk, een andere kijk 
geeft op de toepassing van artikel 10 EVRM en de expressievrijheid van de advocaat bij het 
uiten van kritiek op een lid van de rechterlijke macht. 
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